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Foreword
Brownfield regeneration and the
associated transformation of many
towns and cities has been one of the
great unsung success stories of
recent years. Land is now developed
more efficiently for housing and last
year more than three-quarters of new
homes were built on brownfield land,
up from just over 50% a decade ago.
At its best, this has improved the
urban environment, raised standards
of design and protected the
countryside from unnecessary sprawl.
There is a real danger that shortsighted
responses to current economic conditions
could undermine urban regeneration schemes
in future. This study aims to help avoid such
risks. It explores how the economics of
developing a particular site, whether
greenfield or brownfield, rural or urban, is
influenced by the available alternatives. There
may be many reasons why suitable brownfield
opportunities are not always taken up – sites
in complex, multiple ownership; lack of a
coherent, long term planning strategy; and, in
some cases, the costs of site remediation.
Specifically, this study examines – using
econometric modelling techniques – how
competing greenfield land supply may be a
factor in the viability of brownfield
development. It shows how applying market
signals through the planning process is more
complex and challenging than is sometimes
assumed. It demonstrates that understanding
how local land markets interact and
development sites compete for investment is
key to unlocking the potential of brownfield
land. These interactions have been assumed,
rather than explored, in local, regional and
national planning strategies which have
provided the foundation for urban renewal
over the years. For the first time, this study
reveals the nature and potential consequences
of ‘competing’ land supply and how this may
affect prospects for brownfield development,
and points to a new perspective on the role of
market signals in planning.
CPRE recognises the need for more homes.
Our recent Vision for the Countryside in 2026
– which will be our centenary year – envisages
continuing success with urban regeneration.
We foresee over 2 million high-quality homes
being created between now and then, mainly
on brownfield sites. By continuing to recycle
brownfield land and buildings within our
villages, towns and cities it is possible to both
provide the homes we need and protect the
countryside. Tremendous scope remains to
make further progress but only if we heed the
findings of this research.
Today’s challenging economic circumstances
have made many development schemes
marginal. Planners are under pressure to
allocate ever more greenfield land for
development to meet housing targets. We need
a longer term view which recognises the wider
benefits of urban regeneration. Unless we act
with vision, we face the prospect of returning to
greenfield sprawl and urban decline – which will
benefit no one in the long run.
Neil Sinden
Director of Policy and Campaigns, CPRE
June, 2009
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Executive Summary
In England there has been substantial
change in national planning policy
over recent years, with greater
market emphasis in setting housing
targets since the publication of Kate
Barker’s Review of Housing Supply in
2004. Recent research focuses
strongly on the national and regional
dimensions of housing supply and
affordability. Yet, the impact of
planning policy on supply,
affordability and the economics of
development has received relatively
little attention at the level of local
housing markets.
This report provides a significant contrast to a
series of recent national and regional level
housing affordability projects. It focuses on
the determinants of housing development
viability at the local level and explores how the
supply of greenfield land with planning
permission for residential development affects
the economics of brownfield redevelopment.
Such issues reach to the heart of the
Government’s brownfield land policy,
especially to its continued commitment to a
60% national brownfield target and a
sequential approach in determining proposals
for new housing development and more
recently to the encouragement it has given
local authorities to adopt more interventionist
strategies in pursuit of the brownfield agenda.
The quantitative work reported here draws on
datasets that include information on detailed
residential planning consents in nine case
study local authorities, and digitised local plan
data. Data preparation work included
significant cross-checking of planning
consents against local plan records as well as
direct contact with, and advice from, local
planning authorities. The research combines
these data sources with information obtained
from the Department for Communities and
Local Government (DCLG), and with robust
models estimated in the course of previous
research projects (including, for example, a
model of new-build house prices).
The research finds that site-specific
development viability falls as competition
increases – measured in terms of the supply of
both planning consents and newly completed
homes. At the individual local authority level,
the results suggest a more complex picture.
Greenfield land supply appears to reduce the
viability of brownfield development in some
local authorities, but not in others. Our
conclusions must be tentative given the pilot
nature of this study, but the results suggest
that high levels of greenfield supply, particularly
in areas of weaker housing demand, reduce
the viability of brownfield development.
Overall, these results suggest that high levels
of housebuilding in one part of a local authority
area might well send market signals that make
development less viable in other parts of the
same authority area. This would point to the
need for caution in thinking carefully about the
level and timing of planning consents.
These findings point to the need for those
engaged with setting targets, planning or
delivering new homes to:
• examine the capacity of local housing
markets to absorb new supply, both in
time and space;
• understand the operation of crucial market
signals at the local level; and
• ensure the timing, location and level of
consents is informed by an understanding
of how local land and housing markets
interact.
The findings also highlight the extent to which
development viability is place-specific and
suggest that the power of local authorities to
improve relative viability through active place-
making strategies should not be
underestimated.
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1: Introduction
Proposals for new housing
development often create intense
controversy, both nationally and
locally. The planning system seeks to
manage this controversy by
connecting local decision-making with
national policy advice. Since 1998, for
example, central government has set a
60% national brownfield target for new
housing development in England, but
expects local circumstances to
determine how exactly this should
applied at local level.1
In England at least, there has been substantial
change in national planning policy over recent
years, with an ‘economic discourse’ accorded
greater priority in setting housing targets since
the publication of Kate Barker’s Review of
Housing Supply in 2004. Yet, the introduction
of market signals into planning thought
remains problematic, conceptually, practically
and analytically. Over-reliance on market
signals at the present time, for example,
conceptually might indicate the need to
reduce housing land allocations since the
recession has caused most housebuilders to
restrict their new-build activity.2 This highlights
the different timescales and priorities of the
planning system and the housing market.
This report, however, is more concerned with
the analytical difficulties that arise in seeking
to incorporate market signals into planning
decisions and specifically with the danger of
adopting too narrow an approach to this.
Specifically, the report provides a significant
contrast to much of the macroeconomic
modelling work of recent years sponsored by
the DCLG and the National Housing and
Planning Advice Unit (NHPAU). These models
have sought to link house prices, earnings,
migration patterns, household formation and
employment to land release at the regional
level. Yet, whether and when development
actually takes place is also an outcome of
forces at work in local land and housing
markets, about which too little is still known.
This emphasises the need for the
macroeconomic approach to housing
markets taken so far to be balanced by a
more microeconomic understanding of how
these important local forces interact in
practice. The research reported here makes
an important contribution in that direction by
exploring how the supply of greenfield land
with planning permission for residential
development affects the economics of
brownfield redevelopment.
The research takes an essentially quantitative
approach to exploring the dynamics of local
land and housing markets. It seeks to build an
econometric model of development viability at
the site specific level which enables the
relationships between greenfield land release
and the viability of nearby brownfield
redevelopment to be explored in detail. To
achieve this, it is first necessary to build
contributory models of house prices,
construction costs and likely build-out rates.
Alongside planning approvals and housing
completions data at the local authority level,
the model then includes measures of
affordability and deprivation to gain a fuller
picture of housing demand. It looks explicitly
at the physical distance between
development sites and their nearest
competitors and explores the extent to which
competition lessens over distance. Overall,
the model has a strong statistical
performance, although its results at individual
local authority level are more complex.
The work presented here is essentially
exploratory and intended to open up a new
dimension in looking at the potential
contribution of economic analysis within
planning decisions. Specifically, it suggests
that macroeconomic analysis undertaken at
the national and regional levels needs to be
balanced by more fine-grained locally-based
work to better understand the likely
relationship between planning decisions and
housing and land markets.
As a pilot study, it was possible to undertake
work in only nine local authority areas in
England. No claim is made that these nine
1 It should be noted that
new homes contributing
to the brownfield target
can come from both new
development on
brownfield land and the
conversion of existing
buildings.
2 It is important to
recollect that Kate Barker
did not suggest that use
of market signals would
always result in the
allocation of more land for
development. Specifically,
she pointed out that:
‘Prices are not a
substitute for planning.
However, using them as
part of the decision
making process can lend
itself to better decision
making, not just in high





using prices can allow a
better assessment of the
costs and benefits of
development, there is no
presumption that society
would then choose to
increase the level of
development’ (Barker, K,




Treasury, p. 33, 2004).
areas provide a fully representative sample of
English local authorities, but they were
chosen carefully to ensure a range of supply
and demand conditions and different
balances between greenfield and brownfield
development. The results are thus presented
as tentative, interesting and indicative of the
need for more detailed econometric work to
be undertaken at the local level.
The next chapter provides a wide-ranging
review of the policy context for the research.
The research method is set out in Chapter 3,
which also explains how the case study areas
were chosen. The actual construction of the
model is described in Chapter 4, while the
results and their implications are considered
in Chapters 5 and 6. A summary of the
research is presented in Chapter 7.
1: Introduction
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2: Policy context for the
research
Introduction
Disputes about the release of land for
housing development have proved an
inherently controversial feature of the
English planning system. For two
reasons, no settled consensus has
yet emerged, or indeed is ever likely
to emerge, around the crucial
choices that have to be made about
new housing development.
The first reason reflects the acute divergence
of interest between relevant stakeholders and
especially between those who see the
exchange value in land and those who
visualise its amenity and broader
environmental value, including the
sustainability benefits derived from protecting
wildlife habitats, areas of ecological
importance and scarce natural resources.
While the planning system can mediate
between these interests on a site by site
basis, it never wholly reconciles them. The
second reason concerns the ambiguous
nature of the planning system itself (at least in
the UK), which, while seeking to influence
such market outcomes as the location of
development, remains heavily reliant on the
initiative of market actors for the delivery of
important public policy goals such as
increased home ownership.
Putting these two reasons together helps
explain the inherent ‘wickedness’ of housing
land supply as a policy issue in the sense that
policy development has been characterised
not by mutual learning and progression
towards shared values, but rather by conflict,
turbulence and at times, simple re-invention
of wheels that have been previously
discarded. This is a process that has taken
place over at least the past 40 years as
respective interests have fought over three
main policy questions:
1. Where the overall supply of development
land is regulated by the state, what is the
best way to manage and monitor the
release of that land? This question can be
traced back to the early 1970s, when
worries about perceived shortages of
building land began to attract political
attention.
2. What should be the split between
greenfield and brownfield development?
This question can be traced back to a
broadening interest in the concept of
sustainability from the late 1980s.
3. What are the broader economic effects of
state control of land release, and
specifically what information on the impact
of planning policies on land and housing
markets is relevant in deciding future
policy directions? This question is a more
recent addition to the debate.3 Although it
began to emerge from the early 1990s, it
remained of more peripheral concern to
policy-makers until the early years of the
21st century, when the Barker Review
(2003 and 2004) placed it at the forefront
of policy making.
The purpose of this chapter is to review how
the current policy landscape reflects the
constant struggle of policy-makers to answer
or reconcile these questions. The next three
sections of the chapter thus focus on each
question in turn. While we acknowledge that
the policy drama is played out across the UK
under its different devolved administrations,
our focus is on England in the period
especially since 1997. We seek, in particular,
to explain why the third question has
emerged strongly in recent years to rival the
first two in policy importance. In our account,
we argue that the macroeconomic direction
from which policy-makers have sought to
address this question needs to be matched
by more locally-based microeconomic work if
a truly productive approach to the economic
analysis of planning and development
impacts is ever to be achieved.
In the final section of the chapter, we therefore
consider how the three questions are
inherently linked and why this makes essential
detailed analysis of the potential economic
3 While the report of the
Urban Task Force,
published in 1999, had an
implicit concern with the
economic prosperity of
cities, it did not explicitly
address the impact of
planning policies on
housing markets.
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relationship between greenfield land release
and brownfield viability, as explored in the
remainder of the report.
Managing the supply of land and
housing
Despite the introduction of a comprehensive
town and country planning system in 1947 and
the emergence of Green Belt policy from 1955,
a relatively relaxed view of greenfield
encroachment was taken during the 1950s and
1960s, especially since the public sector itself
promoted both the new towns programme and
extensive local authority housing estates at the
urban periphery. Concerns about land
shortages only began to emerge in the early
1970s, coinciding with the growth of the
speculative housebuilding industry, rapid house
price inflation and the greater scope for public
participation in the planning process. These
factors created the potentially explosive political
cocktail that all successive governments have
sought to manage. The numerous policy
reviews and re-interpretations that have taken
place over the decades obscure one important
fact – that the inherent controversy around
housing land supply is not primarily a clash
about techniques, but essentially one around
values and interests.
So if we wish to explain why particular
technical approaches have been preferred in
particular policy documents, we need to
know which values and interests were in the
ascendancy at that time. This will help us
understand why the economic discourse has
become ever more important in setting
housing policy and, as a basis for our own
research, identify some of the ways in which
its method of analysis remains partial. We
shall explore, in turn, the two main
components of housing land supply: first,
assessing likely housing need and demand
and second, managing the release of land to
meet that need and demand.
Demographic forecasts of population and
household growth have long informed the
amount of land allocated by the planning
system for new dwellings. It is widely
acknowledged that such forecasting is not an
exact science and is open to much
interpretation, especially around migration
assumptions. This has ensured extensive
debate, especially at the strategic planning
level about the validity of particular
demographic forecasts, with development
interests often claiming that they
underestimate likely growth, and amenity
interests the reverse or at least questioning
their status in planning policy.
For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the
Secretary of State, playing the role of final
arbitrator in this process, tended to side more
often with development interests and push
final housing numbers above (and sometimes
significantly above) those proposed by local
planning authorities. Two important changes
then occurred. Procedurally, the Secretary of
State largely withdrew from the role of final
arbitrator even for structure plans, allowing
more independence for local planning
authorities. More significantly perhaps, in
1998, John Prescott (the Secretary of State
responsible for planning at the time), signalled
an end to the longstanding ‘predict and
provide’ mentality that closely linked
demographic forecasting to proposed
housing numbers and its replacement by the
term ‘plan, monitor and manage’ in which
events on the ground, including the extent of
housebuilding actually taking place, would
become much more influential in setting future
levels of growth.
These policy changes coincided with renewed
emphasis on the importance of urban
regeneration or urban renaissance, as it was
termed by the Urban Task Force (1999), which
led to the publication of an Urban White Paper
(Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions [DETR], Our Towns and
Cities: The Future, 2000a). This emphasised
the importance of bringing brownfield land and
empty urban property back into use, through
tackling vacancy and low demand,
assembling land, dealing with contamination,
2: Policy context for the research
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2: Policy context for the research
promoting investment and enterprise and
setting sustainable renewal as a new focus for
regeneration agencies. Significantly, the Urban
White Paper made explicit links between
regenerating cities and protecting the
countryside, proclaiming that regeneration
was ‘also vital if we are to relieve the pressure
for development in the countryside and
preserve the essential qualities of rural
communities’ (DETR, Our Towns and Cities:
The Future, 2000a,) and that ‘We have also
been allowing too many new houses to be
built on greenfield sites. This threatens the
countryside and fuels the flow of people away
from urban centres towards the edge of towns
and cities and beyond’ (ibid.).
What seemed like an important victory for
amenity interests was, however, short-lived.
Although the concept of ‘plan, monitor and
manage’ was embodied in the seminal
revisions to Planning Policy Guidance note 3:
Housing published in 2000, within only three
years the Government’s appointment of the
economist, Kate Barker, to conduct a
fundamental review of housing supply
signalled the resurgence of development
interests and their capacity to reframe an
apparently technical agenda to their own
advantage. Essentially, market signals began
to be placed alongside demographic
forecasts in determining appropriate levels of
housing growth.
Responding to Barker in 2005, the
Government thus set a target of 200,000 net
additional dwellings each year in England,
compared to the then provision of about
150,000 net additional dwellings annually. It
was suggested that the higher building target
would enable home ownership to reach 75%
in England, although this was seen as an
aspiration rather than a policy to be achieved
by any particular date. Two years later, at the
height of the housing boom in mid-2007, the
building target was raised to 240,000 net
additional dwellings each year in England,
intended to produce two million new homes
by 2016 and three million by 2020.4
While demographic-based planning
represented an interventionist approach
designed to produce a different set of
outcomes from the market, it remained
unclear how the incorporation of market
signals into local housing forecasts would
operate in practice, especially in view of the
extent of technical development required to
make it possible to combine demographic
and market-based forecasts of future housing
need and demand. This divergence was
illustrated by two housing market scenarios
for the 1996-2016 period described by Paul
Cheshire (Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
2008) one of which was based merely on the
projected 4.4 million additional households
with the other combining this with a 25%
growth in real incomes over the period.
Cheshire estimated that, with the same level
of housebuilding, the first scenario would
produce a 4.4% increase in real house prices
across England over the period and the
second a 131.9% increase. He concluded:
‘Thus, in a world in which the supply of
land is restricted, the actual driver of real
house prices seems to be income, not
household numbers, and this stems from
the income-elasticity of demand for
space.’ (Cheshire, P, Reflections on the
nature and policy implications of planning
restrictions on housing supply, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 2008)
Whether or not one agrees with this
conclusion, the main point is that very few
methods yet exist, at least at the local level, to
combine demographic and market data in
setting planning policy and those which do are
not particularly sophisticated. Moreover, in the
short to medium term, it is arguable that
market-based methods would suggest that
less rather than more land might be
consumed for new homes, as the
housebuilding industry has wound down in
response to the recession. Much more work
thus will be needed, especially at the
microeconomic level, to enable planning
authorities to respond sensibly to the desire
within the re-cast Planning Policy Statement 3:
4 In October 2008,
Margaret Beckett,
Minister of State for
Housing and Planning,
when giving evidence to




the figure of two million
new homes by 2016 as a
‘target’ but the figure of





5 Department of the
Environment Circular 9/80
introduced the
requirement for a five-year
land supply and for
housing land availability
studies undertaken jointly
by local authorities and
the housebuilding
industry. In the absence of
a five-year supply, Circular
22/80 introduced ‘a
presumption in favour of
granting planning
applications for housing,
except where there are
clear planning objections.’
6 Successive Secretaries
of State have used
notification powers, behind
which lies the threat to
call-in particular types of
planning application, to
manage the extent to





Between 1999 and March
2009, local authorities had
to notify the Secretary of
State of proposals they
sought to approve




1999). In addition from
2000 to 2007 similar
notification requirements
applied where they sought
to approve applications to
150 or more dwellings on
greenfield land, or on a
greenfield site over 5
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Housing for more market-based information to
be used in future housing decisions. As we
show later in this report, this must include
better knowledge of how local land markets
actually work.
Over the past three decades managing
housing land release has become as
important a policy function as forecasting
need and demand. The concept of a readily
available five-year housing land supply can be
traced back to Michael Heseltine’s time as
Secretary of State for the Environment in the
early 1980s.5 For at least the next decade,
housebuilders achieved a privileged position
within the policy-making process, with Tom
Baron, who had previously run a major
housebuilding company, brought in as
Heseltine’s Special Adviser, and more
significantly with local authorities required to
work alongside representatives of the
housebuilding industry in conducting Joint
Housing Land Availability Studies to identify
readily-available development land.
By the late 1980s, however, the system had
degenerated into one characterised as
‘planning by appeal’ whereby local authorities
clearly unable to demonstrate an effective five-
year land supply found Heseltine’s successors
as Secretary of State regularly ruling in favour
of appeals brought by housebuilders. Some
balance was restored when the Planning and
Compensation Act 1991 raised the status of
development plans in decision-making. This,
combined with brownfield targets of 50% from
1995 and 60% from 1998 (see below),
reflected the increasing influences of amenity
interests during the 1990s and their success
in moving the policy agenda much more in the
direction of sustainability.6
This success perhaps reached its high point
with the publication of PPG3 in 2000 in which
Urban Capacity Studies finally replaced
Housing Land Availability Studies, and a
sequential test was introduced allowing local
planning authorities to resist greenfield
development while suitable brownfield sites
remained undeveloped (see box below).
Specific allowance could also be made in
development plan numbers for likely windfall
sites to reflect past and expected trends in
brownfield sites coming forward for
development that had not been known, or
could not be allocated, when the relevant
development plan was produced.7 So,
although the requirement for a five-year land
hectares (DETR, Circular
08/00, 2000c). In March
2009 referral requirements
were further relaxed. Local
planning authorities need
no longer notify the
Secretary of State of
departure applications with
the exception of certain
categories of development
affecting Green Belt, flood
risk areas or World
Heritage Sites; or entailing
the loss of playing fields; or
developing town centre
uses out of town (DCLG,
Circular 02/2009, 2009).
7 Windfall sites ‘are those
which have not been
specifically identified as





could include, for example,
large sites resulting from,
for example, a factory
closure or small sites such
as a residential conversion
or a new flat over a shop’
(DCLG, PPS 3: Housing,
p. 19, 2006).
2: Policy context for the research
THE SEQUENTIAL APPROACH
Paragraph 32 of PPG3 (2000) stated
that ‘In determining the order in which
sites . . . should be developed, the
presumption will be that previously-
developed sites (or buildings for re-use
or conversion) should be developed
before greenfield sites.’ Advocates of
the sequential test consider that its
introduction contributed significantly to
the rise in brownfield completions from
2001, as it was felt to provide a clear
policy basis for assessing proposals for
new residential development. Despite
the presumption by many that the
sequential test had been abandoned in
2006 with the replacement of PPG3 by
PPS3, a recent appeal decision at
Stoke-on-Trent makes clear this is not
the case. The decision letter turning
down the appeal against refusal of
planning permission for 36 houses in
the Green Belt commented, inter alia,
‘the Secretary of State agrees that the
proposal would not meet the sequential
test set out in PPG3, which was extant
at the time of the inquiry and which is




DL.pdf). Although PPS3 states that ‘the
priority for development should be
previously developed land, in particular
vacant and derelict sites and buildings’,
it limits local planning authorities' ability
to phase land release or take into
account windfalls to achieve a
sequential approach in practice.
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2: Policy context for the research
supply remained technically in existence after
2000, its context and meaning changed
substantially.8 By 2001, however, the total
number of new dwellings completed in
England fell to a record postwar low of
129,500, compared with almost 164,000 in
1990. Development interests blamed the
planning system for their lack of achievement
and, in the post-Barker world, were successful
in urging another major policy revision, with
the publication of PPS3 in 2006 (DCLG,
Housing Green Paper, 2006a).
The potential importance of windfall sites is
illustrated by experience in the South West
and West Midlands. In the South West in
2007/8 55% of new housing development
took place on windfall sites – a proportion
which in the case of Dorset rose to almost
85% (South West Regional Planning
Assembly, Annual Monitoring Report, 2008).
During the same period in the West Midlands
completions on windfall sites amounted to
75% of all completions (West Midlands
Regional Assembly Examination in Public
Statement, paragraph 17, Matter 4A ‘Land for
Housing’, ref 4.A/WMRA/R400, May 2009).
It is possible to argue that PPS3 rewound the
clock not simply to 2000, but well before it.
Local authorities were required to identify not
merely an immediate supply of deliverable
housing sites9 for the first five years of a Local
Development Framework, but also a further
supply of potential development sites for the
next five years and indeed, the identification of
either more sites or broad locations for growth
for the following five years.
Alongside what amounts to a rolling land
supply, Urban Capacity Studies were
abandoned and Housing Land Availability
Studies re-emerged (albeit with broader
stakeholder involvement) as Strategic
Housing Land Availability Assessments.10
These were matched by Housing Market
Assessments, which were intended to provide
local authorities with the necessary market
data and information for decision-making, but
which were poorly related to specific sites.
The whole essence of PPS3 thus was to set
in place a policy-making framework that
would enable a substantial rise in
housebuilding to take place.
However, it had become apparent that
significantly increased output from the
housebuilding industry would require the
Government not merely to relax its regulatory
framework but to take more direct action to
boost supply. This realisation had initially been
reflected in the Sustainable Communities Plan
of 2003, which promised an additional
200,000 new homes on top of those
previously planned in four growth areas in the
South East of England, at a cost of over £22
billion. Alongside this, action was taken to
tackle low demand and abandonment
affecting over a million homes in the Midlands
and the northern regions, by setting up nine
housing market renewal pathfinders.
By 2007, the Government had further
committed itself to another 150,000 to
200,000 new homes in the next round of
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs) (in addition
to the 1.6 million included in the RSSs then
current), another 150,000 homes to be built
through two rounds of the Growth Points
initiative and between 25,000 and 100,000
planned further homes in five eco-towns
(DCLG, Housing Green Paper, 2007a).11
Ironically then, in the period immediately before
the collapse of the housebuilding industry and
towards the end of the longest period of
postwar growth in the UK, the Government
geared itself up for a further major expansion in
housebuilding in the belief that this was
essential to meet housing demand. Whether or
not it proves to be the case in the long term,
the potential short-term availability of significant
tracts of greenfield building land during a
period of recession, may have a detrimental
impact on another Government priority,
brownfield redevelopment. We now turn to this
issue on which our own work is focused.
8 Paragraph 34 of PPG3
(2002) stated ‘Sufficient
sites should be shown on
the plan's proposals map
to accommodate at least
the first five years (or the
first two phases) of
housing development
proposed in the plan.’
9 Paragraph 34 of PPS3
(2006) defines deliverable
sites as those available











with the notion of a five-
year supply in 1980.




look for suitable housing










11 According to the
National Housing and
Planning Advice Unit,
approved RSSs had, by
March 2008, made
provision for 210,000
homes to be built annually
in England over the period
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Brownfield redevelopment
It is often forgotten that the first brownfield
housing target was introduced by John
Gummer, the last Conservative Secretary of
State for the Environment, who announced in
a 1995 Green Paper, that the Government
wished to see 50% of all new homes in
England built on re-used sites (Department of
the Environment, Our Future Homes, 1995).12
Two strands came together to drive this policy
change. On the one hand, urban regeneration
had become an increasingly important part of
Conservative thinking, especially where it was
driven by the private sector. On the other
hand, the growing influence of sustainability
from the late 1980s caused a fundamental
review of Government thinking towards the
environment, especially after the Rio Summit
of 1992, and demanded tangible action
across a broad range of policy fields. A
brownfield target thus offered a clear
opportunity for John Gummer to bring
together sustainability and urban regeneration.
What is notable, however, is that similar
thinking had begun to emerge from the mid
1980s and specifically in the major review of
Green Belt policy that took place at the time
(Department of the Environment, Circular
14/84, 1984). This crucially added urban
regeneration as an important reason for having
Green Belts. So, conceptually, by the time the
Conservative Government departed office in
1997, the view had been widely established
that sustainable urban regeneration could be
encouraged by a restrictive approach to
peripheral development.
Unfortunately, however, brownfield targets
encouraged politicians to think that the mere
setting of a target was enough to deliver
regeneration on the ground. For as we shall
argue, brownfield targets operate primarily as
an economic device rather than through
political dictat and rely on active intervention
to help create a flourishing housing market.
This is why some consider the extent of
greenfield land release in the present
recession could potentially undermine
brownfield development, irrespective of any
particular targets set nationally or locally.
There had been concern that the arrival of a
Labour Government in 1997 might have spelt
the end for John Gummer’s 50% brownfield
target. In fact, quite the reverse occurred for,
after some initial controversy, John Prescott,
the incoming Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport and the Regions,
announced in 1998 that a more ambitious
commitment would be made. Accordingly, as
the revised PPG3 made clear: ‘The national
target is that by 2008, 60% of additional
housing should be provided on previously-
developed land and through the conversion of
existing buildings’ (DETR, Planning Policy
Guidance 3 (revised), paragraph 23, 2000b).13
This national target was to be translated as
appropriate to each region and thence on to
each local planning area. During this process,
John Prescott enthusiastically set out
increasing regional brownfield targets (Adams
and Watkins, Greenfields, Brownfields and
Housing Development, 2002) and declaring
success as each year’s Land Use Change
Statistics (LUCS) were published.
Yet, even at this stage, the main drawback of
Prescott’s brownfield land policy was apparent
through a close inspection of the LUCS data
in relation to other statistical series published
by the same Government department. This
arose from the policy focus on the relative
proportion of brownfield redevelopment, which
created the paradoxical possibility that
Ministers could claim success, even if the
absolute amount of land recycled fell as a
result of reduced overall housebuilding rates.
In fact, as Table 1 shows, at 82,899 the
absolute number of homes built on previously
developed land in England in 2001 was hardly
any different from the figure of 82,788 for
1993. Absolute brownfield housing numbers
are a more challenging and realistic indicator
of policy success than relative proportions and
have only begun to move significantly upwards
from 2002. So what happened then to change
real outcomes on the ground? Here, two
factors were crucial.
12 The publication of
official Land Use Change
Statistics (LUCS) from the
mid 1980s gave John
Gummer the technical
basis for his policy and
subsequently became
ever more influential as an
annual series in monitoring
brownfield development.
Unfortunately, however,
the LUCS statistics were
misinterpreted by
politicians, especially early
in the 21st century, to
portray the veneer of






13 At that time, both
CPRE (1997a and b) and
the UK Round Table on
Sustainable Development
(1997) called for a 75%
brownfield target. More
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First, the Sustainable Communities Plan of
2003 introduced a more explicitly
interventionist approach to brownfield
development to replace the previous mere
reliance on a target figure. The heart of this
new interventionist approach involved ‘a new
strategic role’ for English Partnerships ‘… to
find and assemble land, especially brownfield
and publicly owned land, for sustainable
development’ (Office of the Deputy Prime
Minister [ODPM], Sustainable Communities:
Building for the Future, 40, 2003). Crucially,
English Partnerships was charged with
developing a comprehensive national strategy
TABLE 1: TOTAL DWELLINGS BUILT ON PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED LAND PLUS ESTIMATED
CONVERSIONS IN ENGLAND 1985-2008
Year Land Dwellings
Total % of new % of land Total Index of Total new % of Total Index of
hectares dwellings used for hectares land used dwellings dwellings dwellings dwellings
of land built on new of land for new completed built on built on built on
used for previously housing used for housing previously previously previously
new developed that was new housing that was developed developed developed
housing land previoulsy that was previously land plus land plus land plus
developed previously developed estimated estimated estimated
developed conversions conversions conversions
1985 8,760 39 3,416 107.8
1986 7,055 38 2,681 84.6
1987 7,500 38 2,850 89.9
1988 7,730 52 41 3,169 100.0
1989 5,660 52 44 2,470 77.9 55
1990 7,240 51 45 3,270 103.2 163,899 54 88,505 107.0
1991 4,640 50 45 2,080 65.6 154,595 53 81,935 99.0
1992 5,200 53 47 2,470 77.9 143,831 56 80,545 97.4
1993 5,570 53 48 2,700 85.2 147,835 56 82,788 100.1
1994 6,230 51 46 2,880 90.9 154,641 54 83,506 100.9
1995 5,820 54 48 2,820 89.0 157,141 57 89,570 108.3
1996 5,120 54 48 2,430 76.7 149,086 57 84,979 102.7
1997 5,630 53 47 2,660 83.9 149,493 56 83,716 101.2
1998 5,490 55 48 2,650 83.6 142,651 58 82,738 100.0
1999 56 50 141,040 59 83,214 100.6
2000 5,370 59 52 2,790 88.0 135,130 62 83,781 101.3
2001 5,460 61 55 2,990 94.3 129,530 64 82,899 100.2
2002 5,050 64 57 2,870 90.6 136,820 67 91,669 110.8
2003 5,250 67 58 3,030 95.6 144,040 70 100,828 121.9
2004 3,780 72 62 2,340 73.8 154,110 75 115,583 139.7
2005 4,240 74 63 2,670 84.2 159,480 77 122,800 148.4
2006 4,090 73 64 2,620 82.7 160,870 76 122,261 147.8
2007 73 69 174,550 77 134,404 162.4
2008 141,930
Source: DCLG, Land Use Change Statistics for 2007 and Housebuilding Statistics Live Table 217, 2009
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for brownfield land and allocated over £500
million over three years to find and assemble
housing sites. Although this was not devoted
entirely to brownfield development, it enabled
the agency to play a central enabling role in
the development of the Thames Gateway, the
fourth and largely brownfield growth area
identified in the Sustainable Communities
Plan. Other actions taken by English
Partnerships included recourse to compulsory
purchase powers to assemble brownfield land
and an explicit programme targeted at the
17,000 hectares of hardcore brownfield land
registered on the National Land Use
Database, which had remained vacant or
derelict since 1993. By 2005, the results of
this more interventionist approach to
brownfield land were beginning to show, with
almost 123,000 dwellings completed on
brownfield sites in that year.
Secondly, and as importantly, the rapidly
rising housing market in the period up to
2007 made brownfield development
increasingly lucrative for the speculative
housebuilders, especially in city centres.
Although the brownfield development boom
was driven forward by the pioneers in the
industry, these more specialist companies
were in a minority and more than balanced by
sceptics who were inherently reluctant to take
on brownfield sites (Payne, The Institutional
Capacity of the UK Speculative Housebuilding
Industry, 2009). What made the difference
was the middle group of housebuilders, who
can be termed pragmatists, whose familiar
greenfield markets proved increasingly hard to
access as planning restrictions tightened and
who saw economic opportunity in switching
production to brownfield locations. Crucially
then, in a rising market, policy operated not
principally by the imposition of targets but by
making brownfield development a more
attractive business proposition through
choking off opportunities elsewhere.
This microeconomic linkage was recognised
by both the Urban Task Force (Towards an
Urban Renaissance, 1999) and in the
Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM,
Sustainable Communities: Building for the
Future, 2003) but primarily in relation to low
demand areas:
‘In the North East and North West, the
potential to maximise the re-use of
brownfield sites is undermined by the
amount of virgin “greenfield” land that
planners have already earmarked or
released for development’ (Urban Task
Force, Towards an Urban Renaissance,
Executive Summary, p. 15, 1999).
‘We will review planning policies in the
regions affected to ensure that they
support the objective of tackling low
demand. We have already reduced the
amount of urban fringe greenfield housing
planned for the North West and North East
and set stretching targets for re-using
brownfield land’ (ODPM, Sustainable
Communities: Building for the Future,
paragraph 2.17, 2003)
A more positive view of the potential of
greenfield restrictions to increase brownfield
viability across many parts of the country was
taken by both Kate Barker (2003) and John
Calcutt (2007) in their respective government
reviews on housing supply and the
housebuilding industry.
‘… targets for brownfield build and the
sequential test have pushed up demand,
and therefore prices, for brownfield land’
(Barker, Review of Housing Supply –
Securing Our Future Needs [Interim Report
– Analysis], p. 147, 2003)
‘Additionally, constraining the supply of
greenfield land will increase demand for
brownfield land. This will increase the price
of brownfield land which should
consequently promote increased supply
as the value of brownfield land for housing
comes to exceed its alternative use value’
(Barker, Review of Housing Supply –
Securing Our Future Needs [Interim Report
– Analysis], p. 147, 2003).
2: Policy context for the research
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‘A prudent local planning authority will
want to make as much use as possible of
brownfield in planning its five-year supply
of housing land, as required by PPS3:
ideally, meeting or exceeding the
Government’s 60% target. However . . .
sites identified for the five-year supply
must be financially viable. There is a risk
that any downturn in the market will make
the less viable sites altogether unviable,
thus increasing the pressure on greenfield
land’ (Calcutt, The Calcutt Review of
Housebuilding Delivery, p. 45, 2007).
Calcutt also expressed a note of caution
reflecting early signs of an economic slowdown.
His point here is crucial. It is possible to set
whatever brownfield target might appeal to
ministers, but unless the economic
fundamentals are in place, the delivery of that
target is likely to prove problematic. As the
House of Commons Environmental Audit
Committee (Greener Homes for the Future? p.
34, 2008) recently commented:
‘Presented with an excess of available
land, it is likely developers will build new
developments on greenfield sites in
preference to developing brownfield sites
within the boundaries of existing
settlements. We recommend that
Government ensures this does not happen
by revising urgently its targets and regional
plans in the light of current market
conditions, and by reintroducing a clear
sequential test in favour of brownfield sites
into planning policy.’
The essential issue, which we explore in this
research, is thus whether and how greenfield
land release affects brownfield viability at the
local level. This points towards a more
integrated approach to housing land policy
rather than the assumption that a particular
brownfield target can be delivered, irrespective
of the balance overall between greenfield and
brownfield in the local land supply.
In this context, it is noticeable that the re-cast
PPS3 published in 2006 retained both the
60% national brownfield target and the
requirement for it to be translated at the
regional and local levels. More importantly, it
urged local authorities to adopt active
interventionist strategies, such as land
assembly and the release of more public
sector land, to help deliver the target at the
local level. It remains unclear how far this
advice has been heeded or indeed, whether it
will remain possible, as public finances
deteriorate. It is thus likely that 2009 and
2010 will prove critical years for brownfield
policy, with less public sector money to spend
on regeneration activities and with private
sector incentives to develop on brownfield
land reduced by the recession. If this proves
to be the case, reliance solely on the 60%
brownfield target would be a policy mistake.
Planning and market signals
Since the late 1980s, there has been much
academic debate on the economic impact of
the planning system (see, for example
Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989 and 1996;
Evans, 1991; Eve, 1992; Bramley, 1993;
Meen and Andrew, 1998 and Monk and
Whitehead, 1999). However, until Gordon
Brown, when Chancellor of the Exchequer
and John Prescott as Deputy Prime Minister
jointly appointed Kate Barker in 2003 to
undertake a fundamental review of housing
supply, this debate had little direct impact on
planning policy. While the catalyst for Barker’s
appointment was the perceived peculiarities
of the British housing market which, it was
alleged, helped make it difficult for the UK to
join the European single currency, the
outcome was concerted policy interest in
housing affordability, as summarised in the
2007 Housing Green Paper:
‘House prices have risen more quickly
than earnings in all regions. On average,
lower quartile house prices are now more
than seven times lower quartile earnings.
This is not just a problem in the south.
Affordability problems in the northern
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regions (measured as the ratio of lower
quartile house prices to earnings) have
risen sharply since 1997. In some areas
the ratio has more than doubled. For
example in Warrington, affordability has
worsened by 140% with the ratio reaching
nearly eight times income in 2006.’
(DCLG, paragraph 18, 2007a).
What most sharply divided opinion was
Barker’s conclusion that the UK’s above
average house price inflation and worsening
affordability could be attributed to a restrictive
planning system and hence could be
alleviated by significantly greater land
releases. It is not the place of this report to
review both sides of this argument in detail,
but it is worth highlighting the recent work of
CPRE (Planning for Housing Affordability,
2007) and Paul Cheshire (Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 2008) as well-argued
contributions to the current controversy on
whether, and to what extent, house price
inflation would weaken and affordability
improve, if much higher levels of housing
development were to be permitted.
The Government itself saw strong connectivity
between housing growth and affordability,
commissioning and publishing a controversial
affordability model (ODPM, Affordability
Targets: Implications for Housing Supply,
2005a) and subsequently establishing the
NHPAU which in 2008 produced a much-
disputed target range for future housing
growth in each English region. Significantly,
both were predicated on macroeconomic
modelling, which sought to link house prices,
earnings, migration patterns, household
formation and employment to land release at
the regional level. It remained unclear how the
results of this regionally-based analysis would
connect with the institutional structure and
microeconomic construction of local land and
housing markets and importantly, whether
substantially higher levels of housebuilding,
even if achievable, could be reconciled with
urban regeneration in general and the 60%
brownfield target in particular. Since the
affordability model itself recognised that ‘The
effect of high prices is anyway to stimulate the
redevelopment of brownfield sites’ (ODPM,
Affordability Targets: Implications for Housing
Supply, 54, 2005a), by implication, it raised the
distinct possibility that an enhanced supply of
greenfield land at certain locations could render
nearby brownfield development less viable.
Barker’s call for the planning system to be
more responsive to market signals was
reflected more strongly in the consultation draft
of the new PPS3 published in 2005 (ODPM,
Consultation Paper on a New Planning Policy
Statement 3 (PPS3) Housing, 2005b) than in
the final version, which emerged a year later.
While the former proposed that speedy take-
up of allocated development sites might trigger
further immediate releases, the latter contained
only a more general expectation for local
planning authorities to take market information
into account. Moreover, research
commissioned by the DCLG (Planning for
Housing: Market Signals, 2007c) highlighted
both the complexity of incorporating market
signals within the planning process and the
impossibility of finding a relevant common
indicator for this purpose. While the research
reinforced the policy move towards a broader
market assessment, it again emphasised the
fine-grained market inter-connections at local
level, with the comment that:
‘Developers may become less able to fund
remediation costs from development gain,
as accelerated land release leads to an
increase in housing delivery, which may
cause house prices to fall and lead to lower
development gain’ (DCLG, Planning for
Housing: Market Signals, 4, 2007c).
What has thus begun to emerge from the
debate on market signals is the growing
awareness that reliance on too simple
indicators is likely to be misleading and that
policy needs to be based on a more thorough
assessment of how land and housing markets
operate at the local level. Even if one accepts
that there is some linkage between land
release and house prices (and that will remain
disputed by some), overall regional patterns of
2: Policy context for the research
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land release may be less influential on market
prices and development prospects, than their
sub-regional distribution together with specific
locations where any land is to be released
within a local housing market. Nevertheless,
research, and still less policy development, has
yet to drill down to this level of detail. This
makes the attempt within this report to
construct a microeconomic model linking
greenfield release and brownfield viability all the
more innovative and important. For until we
know much more about how a more market-
based approach to planning policy will work at
the local level, the danger remains that broad
policy directions, espoused at the national and
regional levels, will have unexpected and
undesirable delivery outcomes.
Conclusions
As this chapter has argued, housing land
release is an inherently controversial issue,
primarily because it is so hard to reconcile the
amenity and exchange values of most
greenfield development sites. Although
comprehensive town and country planning
legislation, introduced in 1947, gave the state
power to control and restrict development,
over the past 30 to 40 years governments
have become increasingly dependent on the
private sector to initiate development. That
perhaps explains why we can trace more
market-orientated forms of planning back at
least to the early 1980s, when central
government circulars on housing land release
once more began to reflect the interests of
those in the private sector responsible for
housing production. In this sense, increased
concern with market signals within planning
policy is not an entirely new phenomenon but
rather represents the most recent capture of
the relevant technical agenda by those who
would place exchange value above amenity
and broader environmental value.
One of the fundamental reasons why this
happened was the focus of brownfield land
policy on the relative proportion of new homes
built on brownfield land (which was presented
as a success by Ministers). This drew attention
away from the constant decline in English
housebuilding up to 2001 – a decline which
contributed significantly to the market problems
Kate Barker was called upon to investigate.14
What Ministers failed to grasp until it was
perhaps too late was the enormous challenge
involved in switching the attentions of a
speculative housebuilding industry, so weaned
on building housing estates at peripheral
greenfield locations, towards creating
sustainable communities at brownfield locations.
As this suggests, if an ambitious brownfield
target is to be reconciled with high levels of
housebuilding in the medium to long term, it
may require more sustained government
intervention in urban place-making than
recognised so far. Without this, the pursuit of
affordability targets through the incorporation
of market information into planning decisions,
although presented as a technical exercise, is
likely to prioritise housing production above
urban regeneration and cause downward
pressure on brownfield development targets.
The tragedy, of course, would be that failure to
fully embrace an urban place-making agenda
that might turn towns and cities into the
destination of choice for housebuilders and
prospective residents alike (rather than a
convenient location for excessive high-density
apartment building) may necessitate a planning
regime in which the only way to deliver required
housing numbers is to prioritise market-led
development. The current recession,
regrettable as it is, thus comes at a critical
policy moment for housing land release.
Without a real commitment to urban place-
making over the medium to long term in which
planning authorities take responsibility for
development creation rather than mere
development control, it is likely that
governments wishing to see a substantially
greater number of new homes built annually in
the UK in future years compared to the years
before this recession, will be forced to cede the
location of new housing to development
interests.15
14 Kate Barker was
tasked by HM Treasury in
2003 to conduct a review
of issues underlying the
lack of supply and
responsiveness of
housing in the UK.
15 At the time of the 2009
Budget, the Government
promised to ‘report at the
2009 Pre-Budget Report
on progress and set out
its strategy to support a
timely and effective
housing supply response
through the recovery, in
order to maximise delivery
of high quality, energy
efficient homes,












objectives, such as urban
regeneration, in the light
of experience since the
onset of the credit crunch.
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Introduction
This project examines the relationship
between the supply of greenfield land
with planning permission for
residential development, and the
economics of brownfield residential
development. The project therefore
addresses important research
questions that have arisen during the
course of the ‘post-Barker’ debate. In
particular, the project considers the
relationship between development
viability, at the individual site level, and
wider local housing market factors
including:
> total land supply;
> the ease and availability of planning
permission; and
> the balance between greenfield and
previously developed land in the
composition of the land supply.
A number of specific research questions can
be identified as follows:
> Where brownfield land is in relatively short
supply, does this enhance or erode
viability?
> Conversely, where brownfield land is in
abundant supply does this enhance
viability (because housing developers are
more specialised and regard this type of
site as the norm) or reduce viability
(because greenfield alternatives are harder
to come by and can generate higher new-
build housing prices)?
> Is there a critical mass effect? If the
viability of brownfield development is low,
at what stage in the land supply balance
between greenfield and brownfield sites do
the economics of brownfield development
become acceptable to housing
developers?
These research questions therefore
encapsulate a view that the land market, and
the forces that combine to determine
development viability, are best viewed as
dynamic processes. The research approach is
designed to consider spatial effects such as the
local level of competing supply pertinent to a
given site, and temporal effects including the
supply of land with planning permission and the
rate at which this is absorbed by local markets.
Given the complexity of local housing
markets, and considerable variety in terms of
overall housing land supply and the
greenfield/brownfield balance within this,
there is a strong argument that the research
questions cannot adequately be addressed
using a small-scale, in-depth, qualitative or
case-study based approach. A quantitative
approach to the research questions carries a
number of advantages. In particular, a
quantitative approach allows the estimation of
key relationships between the economic
viability of brownfield and greenfield sites and
a range of factors including:
> the quantity of competing sites;
> the levels of house prices, construction
costs and interest rates; and
> total land supply.
Given the argument that development sites
within a local housing market may effectively
compete with each other, a quantitative
approach also offers the possibility of
estimating whether greenfield competing sites
have a different impact on development viability
in comparison with brownfield competing sites.
A quantitative approach also has the potential
to give insights about general relationships
between variables. However, it can offer little
insight regarding complex relationships or highly
specific circumstances. For these reasons, the
methods adopted by this study do not rule out
subsequent qualitative or case study based
follow-up work. They do offer potential for
establishing whether relationships exist, and
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offering insight as to potentially fruitful avenues
for further, more in-depth research.
Elements of the research method
At the heart of this project is the question of
whether the quantity and/or proximity of
competing sites impacts on the development
viability of sites with planning permission. The
final stage in our quantitative approach entails
the construction and estimation of a statistical
model designed to address this, and related,
research questions. However, a number of
intervening steps are necessary first.
Development viability cannot be observed
directly, primarily because housebuilders carry
out development appraisal calculations
internally, and there is no publicly available
source of this information. Viability, following
well-rehearsed logic, is a residual of expected
housing sales revenue over development
costs with an allowance for land acquisition
and developer’s profit. Logically, viability can
be estimated given the means of predicting
the housing sales revenue expected from the
development of a site combined with a means
of predicting associated development costs.
Our initial estimation of development viability,
on a site by site basis, therefore requires
robust models of house prices and of
construction costs. These are reviewed, in a
conceptual sense, later in this chapter.
The model of development viability
Development viability can be conceptualised
as a simple residual valuation calculation in
which construction costs are subtracted from
the expected revenues generated from the sale
of completed housing. Residual valuations are
often used by housebuilders and landowners
to carry out a basic assessment of either land
value, or potential development profit.
There are some practical difficulties in applying
the residual model to form an index of
development viability. For example, while there
is substantial market evidence on house prices
across cities, there is minimal knowledge on
intra-urban land plot prices – these data are
only available on an aggregated basis, and not
at site level. Similarly, there is no reliable source
of housebuilders’ development profits on a site
by site basis. Clearly, aggregated information
on profits and costs is available for public
limited companies, but this has little value to
this research given the impossibility of
disaggregating back to site level profits.
It follows that, for the purposes of this research,
only two of the important development
economics variables can reasonably be
estimated: housing sales revenue and
construction costs. In order to derive a site-level
index of development viability, predicted
housing sales revenues are divided by
predicted construction costs. This yields an
index in which a value of one and below
represents an unviable site (because land value
and profits would be zero), and higher values
represent higher rates of viability. However, it is
important to note that this approach allows us
to say nothing about any relationship between
land value and profit – these are integrated
within the index of development viability.
Figure 1 demonstrates the linkages between
the house price model, construction cost
model and index of viability. The latter is
shown at the foot of the diagram. The model
of viability focuses on this in particular, and
seeks to explain viability with reference to
economic, local market and planning factors.
This is picked up in detail in the next section.
In summary, the model of development
viability is designed to explain estimated,
rather than known, levels of development
viability. These estimates are formed using as
robust a methodology as possible. New-build
house prices and construction costs are
estimated using well-rehearsed and widely
accepted methodologies. They are then
combined to provide an index of viability
defined as the ratio of expected development
value to development costs. The house price
and construction cost models giving rise to
these estimates of development viability are
examined in more detail in the next chapters.
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The house price model
A statistical model of new-build house prices
is required in the context of this research for a
number of reasons. If we work backwards
through the sequence of steps required to
build a model of development viability then we
can establish the following statistical
requirements:
> building a model of viability requires some
measure of viability; in other words: an
index of the viability of each observation
within a sample of housing development
sites;
> an index of viability can be formed from
the estimated development value and
development cost associated with a
particular development proposal in a given
location; and
> the potential development value of a given
site and location can be assembled given
information on the type and scale of
development and, importantly, a reliable
means of predicting housing sale prices.
It follows that building a model of new-build
house prices is an important, but transitional
step, in the overall research method. In fact,
there is extensive housing economics
literature that deals with the micro-scale
determinants of individual house prices. Much
of this literature is built on the idea that house
prices can be seen as a function of physical
attributes and location, with the impact of
these factors changing over time.
Models of house prices constructed according
to these assumptions are generally known as
hedonic regression models. They follow
statistical conventions first laid out formally in a
housing market context by Rosen (Journal of
Political Economy, 1974), but which had
previously been applied to the problem of
modelling automobile prices in the United
States. Hedonic models allow housing to be
viewed as a composite good. The logic is that
the market price of a house (a composite
good) should be derived from the implied
market prices of housing attributes (such as
bedrooms, living rooms, property design and
location, for example). Operationalising such a
model requires a dataset which records the
transaction price and both physical and
location descriptions of a sample of housing
transactions. The implied prices of housing
and locational attributes are then estimated
statistically.
In most examples of published hedonic house
price models, the modelling results (and what
they imply) are the focus of the work. As
mentioned earlier, the requirement for a house
price model in this study is much more
practical. The value of the model is limited to
its ability to assist in answering the following
operational research question:
> For a given site that has detailed planning
permission for residential development,
can we predict the likely sale price of each
of the new dwellings proposed?
Provided that the house price model is capable
of performing the above, with an acceptable
margin of error, our interest in the house price
model is complete. When combined with
knowledge of the house type mix of a
particular development site, the house price
model can be used to predict development
value (the amount of money that can be
generated by selling finished housing units).
The construction cost model
As we noted earlier, an index of development
viability may be constructed given knowledge
of the development value associated with a
particular development proposal, and the
likely development cost. It follows that a
model of new-build house prices is useful to
this research only if accompanied by an
independent model capable of predicting
development costs. Such a model should be
based on our knowledge of the proposed
house type mix associated with a given site.
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It is well established that housing and flat
designs are heavily standardised in the UK.
Indeed, Leishman and Warren (Construction
Management and Economics, 2006) carried
out a detailed analysis of the underlying
variation in the range of UK housebuilders’
standardised housing designs. One of their
findings is that the apparently large range of
house types offered by housebuilders
effectively boils down to a much narrower set
of product types defined by property type,
size and number of rooms. This heavy
standardisation of property types is beneficial
from the point of view of this research, as it
reinforces the logic of establishing a relatively
simple statistical model of residential
development costs.
The academic literature on construction
economics and cost modelling suggests that
project-specific construction costs are likely
to be heavily influenced by the size of the
development project because economies of
scale are thought to be important, and
because larger scale projects generally
involve longer construction periods and hence
greater exposure to economic uncertainties.
Regional and local economic factors are also
likely to influence costs, primarily because the
relative costs and supply of labour and
materials vary between local, and particularly
regional, construction markets.
Macroeconomic variables such as interest
rates and inflation are also known to exert an
influence over construction costs. The
impacts of changes in such variables are likely
to vary over time, rather than between
different local or regional markets.
Selection of case study areas
As noted earlier in this chapter, development
viability may vary depending on the level of
land supply in a local housing market in
addition to the balance between greenfield
and brownfield land supply. Over time,
economic variables such as house price
levels and interest rates should also have a
significant effect on development viability.
Within a local housing market area, local
factors including neighbourhood quality and
the local distribution of household incomes
might be expected to exert important
influences on the potential viability of housing
development sites.
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TABLE 2: MATRIX OF CROSS-SECTIONAL SAMPLING REQUIREMENTS
Brownfield land supply
Low High
Case study 3: area of more rapidly
rising house prices
Low Case study 4: area of less rapidly
rising house prices
Case study 1: area of more rapidly Case study 5: area of more rapidly
rising house prices rising house prices
High Case study 2: area of less rapidly Case study 6: area of less rapidly
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3: Research method
The quantitative approach adopted in this
study requires broad representation of a
range of housing and land market conditions,
in addition to macroeconomic and planning
considerations in any sample of data used to
estimate the key relationships. For this
reason, a group of case study local authority
areas is considered in order to ensure
representation of high and low greenfield land
supply relative to brownfield supply, and a
cross-section of housing demand conditions,
defined in terms of house price growth. The
requirements have been summarised in Table
2 on the previous page:
A preliminary analysis of housing completion
totals for the period 2004-2007, and of house
price growth rates in the periods 2002-2004
and 2005-2007, suggested the following
selection of case study areas:
Case study 1: Corby
Case study 2: Suffolk Coastal
Case study 3: North Tyneside
Case study 4: Southampton
Case study 5: Leeds (or Leicester)
Case study 6: Swindon
Although a primarily quantitative research
method underpins this research, the selection
of case study areas is not designed to provide
a fully representative sample. Instead, areas
have been chosen in order to populate the
matrix shown above, and to provide a range
of housing market and supply circumstances.
In addition to the six local authority areas
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT TYPES RELEVANT TO THIS RESEARCH
Development type Category
Bungalows Two bedroom residential development
Bungalows Three bedroom residential development
Flats Two bedroom residential development
Flats Three bedroom residential development
Flats Four bedroom residential development
Flats Residential – flats, apartments
Flats Residential – private development
Flats and housing Two bedroom residential development
Flats and housing Three bedroom residential development
Flats and housing Four bedroom residential development
Flats and housing Five bedroom residential development
Flats and housing Residential – flats, apartments
Housing Two bedroom residential development
Housing Three bedroom residential development
Housing Four bedroom residential development
Housing Five bedroom residential development
Housing Six bedroom residential development
Housing Residential – flats, apartments
Housing Residential – private development
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shown above, Eastleigh, Wigan and Leicester
were added to the selection in order to
improve the geographical representation of
the sample of local planning authorities.
Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of
each case study area.
Description of the data used to
estimate the models
The model of development viability is
estimated using a dataset drawing on a
number of data sources. Information on
detailed planning consents was obtained on
licence from the Landmark Information Group.
This dataset was used to generate information
on the size, date and location of detailed
residential planning consents in the case study
local authority areas for the period 2002-2008.
The planning data contains basic information
describing the development proposed for
each of the detailed planning consents. Table
3 summarises the combinations of interest of
two of these planning data variables –
development type and category.
As Table 3 shows, the planning data contains
information that is potentially of value in
seeking to predict the development value and
costs associated with each of the detailed
planning consents in the dataset. More detail
on the methods used to achieve these
objectives is provided in the next chapter.
As might be expected, the number of detailed
planning consents observed in each of the
case study local authority areas varies
considerably. Corby (with 29 brownfield
consents) and Leeds (with 930) are the
extremes. However, North Tyneside and
Eastleigh also have less than 100 during the
2002-2008 study period. There is also
considerable variation in terms of the typical
size of brownfield developments, defined in
terms of number of dwelling units proposed.
The median overall is six units, and most of
the local authority areas have a similar
median. Exceptions are Corby, Swindon and
Wigan, with higher medians (14, 11 and 10
respectively). These descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 4.
The level of housebuilding activity also varied
quite considerably, both over time and
between local authority areas, during the
study period. This issue is examined in more
detail in Appendix 1, which provides a
contextual discussion of each of the case
study areas. Table 5 summarises annual
housing completions, expressed as a rate per
1,000 households in the local authority area.
3: Research method
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT SIZE BY LOCAL AUTHORITY AREA
Local authority Mean number of units Median number of units Number of observations
Corby 46.62 14 29
Eastleigh 17.97 6 96
Leeds 13.32 6 930
Leicester 14.82 7 324
Newcastle 13.22 7 110
North Tyneside 33.76 6 82
Southampton 8.56 5 382
Suffolk Coastal 16.48 6 112
Swindon 34.41 11 136
Wigan 19.09 10 175
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Land release: the competition faced
by a development site
The research questions, introduced earlier in the
chapter, note the possibility that relationships
may exist between the viability of development
sites, and the quantity and proximity of
competing sites. However, testing for such
relationships requires significant adaptation of
data on detailed planning consents for a
number of reasons. Within a given local planning
authority, this project considers detailed
planning consents granted between 2002 and
2008 inclusive. It follows that:
> not all planning consents within a local
planning authority compete with each
other: some developments reach
completion before developers obtain
permission on other sites;
> the intensity of competition is not equal for
all development sites: there is variation in
terms of size and distance (from a given
focus site); and
> significantly for this research, competing
sites may be either greenfield or
brownfield. The research questions require
separate testing of the effects of
competing greenfield and brownfield
supply on the economics of development.
These facts lead to a requirement for a third
form of model, designed to predict the build-
out rate of every observable detailed planning
permission in our dataset. Such a model can
then be used to predict the rate at which the
capacity of a competing site reduces, and
finally becomes zero (i.e. a completed site).
The build-out rate model is discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.
TABLE 5: HOUSING COMPLETIONS PER 1,000 HOUSEHOLDS
Local authority Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Corby 6.57 14.85 13.43 23.57 28.57 40.65 22.51
Eastleigh 3.15 9.81 16.65 12.74 10.08 13.05 11.45
Leeds 6.50 8.19 10.68 8.59 8.92 11.32 8.35
Leicester 3.88 8.93 6.86 5.52 6.72 5.51 3.80
Newcastle 2.70 1.51 2.01 5.06 3.53 3.11 1.81
North Tyneside 1.35 3.90 7.37 7.12 3.09 7.62 1.17
Southampton 6.92 8.33 7.84 8.83 9.14 8.32 5.03
Suffolk Coastal 9.21 10.51 8.80 11.75 12.02 7.39 5.36
Swindon 8.44 11.62 14.13 18.34 19.30 25.96 13.84
Wigan 4.85 6.49 6.91 7.42 9.09 12.65 5.02
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4: Constructing the model of
development viability
Fundamental drivers of development
viability
As discussed earlier in the report, the
essential research question in this
study concerns the potential effects
of competing supply of planning
consents on the development viability
of a site. However, a well designed
model of development viability should
take into account all logically
identifiable drivers of development
viability. These include macro-
economic influences (particularly
interest rates) and the overall level of
housing demand. The model therefore
includes a number of variables
designed to capture these influences.
At national level:
> interest rates.
At local authority level, the following variables
are used:
> the overall level of annual new-build
housing completions;
> a measure of affordability, as a proxy for
the level of housing demand; and
> the supply of land with planning
permission.
At neighbourhood level, the following variable
is used:
> the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD).
The impact of the competing supply
of planning permissions on viability
Since the research assumes that the volume,
and proximity, of competing planning consents
may influence the viability of sites, one or more
measures of this form of competition must be
constructed at site level. The following variables
are constructed on a site by site basis:
> total outstanding greenfield detailed
planning consents (number of housing
units). Each ‘competing’ consent, in terms
of number of units, is divided by the
distance from that site prior to the
summing of these ‘distance decayed’
measures of competing consents; and
> total outstanding brownfield detailed
planning consents, divided by distance
from that site prior to the summing of
these ‘distance decayed’ measures of
competing consents.
The division of number of units by distance is
an arbitrary adjustment. There is an extensive
literature on spatial interaction modelling (see,
for example, Bramley and Leishman, Urban
Studies, 2005, and Meen, Housing Studies,
1996), and this offers useful insights for this
research. A common approach in this
literature is to divide variables by squared
distance. Economic theory is not able to
provide a firm answer to the correct choice of
distance decay function. To provide for this,
the last two variables described above are
recalculated several times using different
distance decay functions. This includes:
> dividing the unit capacity of each
competing site by distance (d)
> dividing by distance to the power of 1.5
(d1.5);
> dividing by distance to the power of 2 (d2);
and
> dividing by distance to the power of 2.5
(d2.5).
The different specifications of the variables
described above allow greater flexibility in the
development of a model of development
viability. In particular, the existence of a range of
slightly different distance decay functions allows
greater flexibility in later model optimisation.
It is important to note that the planning data is
therefore used in two different ways in the
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construction and estimation of the model of
development viability.
(i) The development viability index is
estimated for each brownfield site in the
sample. The viability model is estimated
using this sample of data matched to
variables as described below.
(ii) The data is used to construct variables that
represent distance-weighted measures of
the total level of competing greenfield and
brownfield supply. These measures are
specific to each site and year of the
viability model sample.
The distinction between greenfield and
brownfield land was developed using a number
of steps since this could not be inferred directly
from the site-specific planning data. As an initial
step, planning consents were taken to refer to
greenfield developments where their location
was not within a defined urban area, or where
the previous use of the site was described as
an urban greenfield activity (such as allotments,
playing fields or parks and recreational ground).
Where doubt remained regarding the
greenfield/brownfield status of sites, assistance
was then requested from local planning
authorities. Most of the local authorities
contacted were able to supply extracts from
internal monitoring databases. This information
was a valuable means of confirming the
greenfield/brownfield status of sites. In some
cases, local planning authorities were not able
to provide database extracts, but lent
considerable assistance by manually working
through sites over which queries remained.
A build rate model is an important step in the
process of converting information on detailed
planning consents to a measure of competing
supply. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical
situation in which we wish to construct a
measure of the total level of competing
nearby land supply with planning permission
for a site (figure 2). Suppose that:
> site X (for which we wish to calculate the
measure) is a site with detailed planning
permission for 20 units granted in 2003;
> Y is a site with detailed planning
permission for 50 units granted in 2002;
> Y is 2 kilometres distant from X;
> Z is a site with detailed planning
permission for 10 units granted in 2003;
and
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> Z is 3 kilometres distant from X.
In seeking to devise a measure of the
competing supply of outstanding planning
permissions, the question is whether Y and/or
Z should enter the calculation. Z is a simple
case. Given that this site received planning
permission in the same year as site X, we can
simply divide 10 (units) by 3 (kilometres) and
add this to the running total of the new
competing supply variable.
Site Y is a different case. It received planning
permission a year earlier. Whether this site
should enter the calculation depends on its
status in 2003 (when site X receives
permission). If site Y is fully developed, with all
housing units sold, then this site does not
represent competing supply with respect to site
X. So, site Y should not enter the calculation.
However, if 20 units on site Y are completed
in 2002, then site Y represents a remaining
capacity of 30 units in 2003 – when site X
receives planning permission. The running
total of the new competing supply variable
should be increased by 30 (units) divided by 2
(kilometres) to reflect this.
Therefore, to return to the point made on page
26, a build rate model is needed in order to
estimate the rate at which sites with detailed
planning permission are developed. In effect,
such a model then distributes the capacity of
a site with newly acquired planning permission
across the year in which planning permission
is received, and subsequent years.
The build-rate model
The statistical results for the build rate model
estimation are shown in Appendix 2. The
model is a simple one, and draws on a larger
dataset of detailed planning consents spanning
the period 2002-2008. The dataset, sourced
from Emap-Glenigan, covers every local
authority in England. The analysis is based on
the dates on which planning permissions were
granted together with project start and
completion dates and construction contract
values as stated in planning applications.
The results of the build rate model suggest that:
> development size increases the length of
development period;
> flats increase the length of development
period at a slightly lower rate than houses
(0.059 months per unit compared with
0.061 months per unit);
> a development comprising only flats has a
shorter development period (by around one
month) than developments with some
housing component in addition to flats; and
> there is a very small, but statistically
significant, economies of scale effect. The
rate at which development times increase
with respect to the number of units drops
as development size rises. In other words,
the 0.059 months per flat and 0.061
months per house begin to reduce as
developments become larger.
Further analysis of the Emap-Glenigan
dataset reveals that the median delay
between the granting of detailed planning
permission and the commencement of
development is eight months (mean 10.06).
The combined information on delay between
planning consent and start, and on the length
of time required to develop a site with a given
number of units of housing or flats, allows the
estimation of total development period for each
site in the ABI dataset. Table 6 summarises the
predictions of the build rate model for several
hypothetical development types.
4: Constructing the model of development viability
TABLE 6: PREDICTED DEVELOPMENT PERIODS FOR HYPOTHETICAL SITES
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The predictions shown in Table 6 clearly reveal
the differences between expected build rates
of flatted and housing developments, and
between smaller and larger developments. For
example, a small development of 10 units is
expected to reach completion around 16.72
months after planning consent in the case of a
development of flats, or 17.75 months for a
housing development. This demonstrates how
these predictions translate to site level annual
completions. The rate at which the expected
development period increases, falls with a
growth in development size. So moving from a
10 unit housing site to a 40 unit site, followed
by a 150 unit site would suggest development
period rising from 17.75 months to 19.54, to
25.60 months – a clearly smaller than
proportionate rise.
Construction of the competing supply
variables
As noted earlier, the build rate model is
required in order to distribute housing
completions at site level over time. This is
necessary to say how much a given site adds
to the level of competing outstanding
planning consents at a given point in time and
at a given distance from every other site.
Table 7 translates the predictions of the build
rate model into this basis for the same
hypothetical development types.
The predictions suggest that even relatively
small sites of around ten units are likely to
represent some level of competition to other
potential development sites for some time. If
year 1 represents the year in which detailed
planning permission is granted, then a ten
unit flatted site should represent competing
TABLE 7: PREDICTED SITE LEVEL COMPLETIONS FOR HYPOTHETICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Development type Completions in year 1 Completions in year 2 Completions in year 3
10 flats 5 5 0
40 flats 15 25 0
10 houses 4 6 0
40 houses 14 26 0
20 flats, 20 houses 14 26 0
150 houses 34 102 14
Development type Delay before start (months) Development period (months)
10 flats 8 8.72
40 flats 8 10.45
10 houses 8 9.75
40 houses 8 11.54
20 flats, 20 houses 8 11.50
150 houses 8 17.60
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supply of ten units for most of that year, and a
competing supply of five units for the early
part of the following year. Meanwhile, a larger
site with a capacity of 150 units should still
represent significant competition a full year
after the grant of planning permission, and a
small amount of competition after two years.
The build rate model is used to predict the
level of competition represented for each site
with detailed planning consent in every month
of the study period 2002-2008. Final
construction of the competing supply
variables is then undertaken by averaging that
level of competing supply for a given calendar
year. For example, a site with planning
permission for 40 units of housing would have
a development period of 11.54 months
following a post-planning delay of eight
months, as shown in Table 6. If a particular
site received planning permission in July
2003, then the diminishing level of
competition on a monthly basis is as shown in
column (A) of Table 8.
Results of the new-build house price
and construction cost models
Appendices 3 and 4 set out the statistical
results relating to the new-build house price
and construction cost models. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, predictions from these
models are used to estimate gross
development value and gross development
costs on a site by site basis. These estimates
are then combined to form an index of
development viability.
The spatial patterns of greenfield competing
supply, and predicted brownfield viability, are
shown for the case of Corby in Figures 3a
and 3b.
4: Constructing the model of development viability
TABLE 8: DIMINISHING CAPACITY OF A 40 UNIT HOUSING SITE
Month (A) Remaining capacity Calendar month and year
1 40.00 July 2003
2 40.00 August 2003
3 40.00 September 2003
4 40.00 October 2003
5 40.00 November 2003
6 40.00 December 2003
7 40.00 January 2004
8 40.00 February 2004
9 36.53 March 2004
10 33.07 April 2004
11 29.60 May 2004
12 26.14 June 2004
13 22.67 July 2004
14 19.20 August 2004
15 15.74 September 2004
16 12.27 October 2004
17 8.80 November 2004
18 5.34 December 2004
19 1.87 January 2005
20 0 February 2005
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5: The model of development
viability – estimation results
The results of the model estimation
are shown in Table 9. As discussed
earlier, the model of development
viability includes a range of variables
measured at local authority level.
These include annual housing
completions, the lower quartile house
price to household earnings level and
the annual level of housing land
supply (outstanding planning
consents in number of units). Interest
rates are clearly measured at national
level, so the model assumes that this
variable impacts on development
viability equally, irrespective of
location. Appendix 5 demonstrates
how the model results can be
combined with variable values in
order to predict development viability.
The variables measuring competing supply
are constructed in the same way for each
local authority area, but are entered into the
model separately for every local authority
area. This has the benefit of permitting the
relationship between competing supply and
viability to differ between local authority areas.
Overall, the model has a strong statistical
performance. The adjusted R square is 0.64,
which means that the model explains 64% of
variation in site level estimates of
development viability. Variables measured at
national and local authority level are
statistically significant and are correctly
signed.16 For example, the level of housing
completions and total outstanding planning
consents are negatively signed. This means
that, as the level of these variables increases,
site level development viability decreases. The
lower quartile house price to household
earnings variable is significant and positively
signed. This suggests that the viability of
brownfield housing developments increases
as affordability decreases which is in keeping
with prior expectations. Development viability
decreases as interest rates rise. In theory,
interest rates should act to constrain viability
in two different ways: (i) households primarily
purchase housing using mortgage finance,
and higher interest rate levels consequently
imply higher relative housing costs; and (ii)
housebuilders are required to finance site
acquisition and construction costs in advance
of housing sale receipts. As interest rates rise,
all other factors being equal, the viability of
development should fall.
Site level development viability decreases as
the IMD score rises. Once again, this is in
keeping with prior expectations as the level of
like-for-like new-build house prices varies
considerably within a local authority area.
Experimentation with the various sub domains
of the IMD did not lead to stronger empirical
results, so the final form of the model includes
only the composite IMD score as shown in
Table 9.
The results for the local authority specific
competing supply variables are rather more
complex and require some detailed
explanation. The normal convention of
including only statistically significant variables
was followed in deriving the final model
shown in Table 9. Therefore, the non-
appearance of local authority competing
supply variables in Table 9 shows that no
statistically significant relationship could be
found between levels of competing supply
and development viability in those local
authority areas.17
The impact of competing greenfield
supply
In Corby and North Tyneside local authority
areas, the level of nearby competing
greenfield outstanding planning consents has
a statistically significant negative effect on
brownfield site viability. In North Tyneside,
competing brownfield supply also has a
statistically significant negative effect, but this
effect is much smaller compared with the
greenfield competing supply effect.
In the Suffolk Coastal and Swindon local
authority areas, proximity of competing
greenfield outstanding consents appears to
16 For example, higher
interest rates should
reduce viability, so we
would expect this variable
to have a negative
coefficient. If the estimation
yields a negative
coefficient, we can regard
this as correctly signed.
17 For example, in the
case of Corby the sum of
brownfield supply divided
by distance was not
statistically significant and
therefore not entered into
the final model.
34 | CPRE | Brownfield Market Signals
5: The model of development viability – estimation results
TABLE 9: MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT VIABILITY – ESTIMATION RESULTS
Variable Coefficient Ta statistic
Constant 0.6355 9.469 ***
Private completions per 1,000 households -0.0074 -1.988 **
Lower quartile house prices to earnings 0.0597 6.044 ***
Interest rates -0.2889 -17.006 ***
Total outstanding planning consents per 1,000 households -0.012 -5.104 ***
Units 0.0417 42.865 ***
Units2 -0.0002 -26.167 ***
IMD -0.0041 -6.274 ***
Corby sum of greenfield supply ÷ distance -5.9354 -3.152 ***
North Tyneside sum of greenfield supply ÷ distance -2.9312 -4.529 ***
Suffolk Coastal sum of greenfield supply ÷ distance 3.4366 4.6645 ***
Swindon sum of greenfield supply ÷ distance 0.8494 2.901 ***
Eastleigh sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance2.5 0.0068 1.939 *
North Tyneside sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance -0.3894 -2.736 ***
Southampton sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance2 0.0109 2.204 **
Suffolk Coastal sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance -0.5008 -3.721 ***
Wigan sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance -0.2569 -4.114 ***
Adjusted R squareb 0.6365
Standard Errorc 0.387
F statisticd 188.929
Number of observations 1,717
Note: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and * at the 10% level
a T statistic – this is a parametric test statistic whose value implies a level of statistical significance. The level of significance is normally looked up in
statistical tables, but a rough rule of thumb is that t statistics of below -2 or above 2 suggest significance with 95% confidence.
b R square – an adjusted measure of the proportion of variance in the data explained by the model
c Standard errors – the estimated standard deviation of a population. The standard deviation can be measured from a sample of data, but the
standard error must be estimated.
d F statistic – this tests the notion that all parameters in a model are jointly equal to zero and that the model therefore has no explanatory power.
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increase the viability of housing development.
In the case of Suffolk Coastal, this is a
pronounced effect. In the case of Swindon,
the magnitude of the effect is much less,
though it is still statistically significant.
The impact of competing brownfield supply
on the viability of brownfield development also
differs between the case study local authority
areas. In North Tyneside, Suffolk Coastal and
Wigan, there is a negative effect, suggesting
that a high supply of brownfield consents acts
to reduce the viability of brownfield
developments. In Eastleigh and
Southampton, there is a very small, but
positive effect. This suggests that brownfield
developments may benefit (in terms of
viability) from the proximity of other brownfield
planning consents.
Summary
The research has examined, in some
considerable detail, the empirical steps taken
to construct variables necessary for testing
the research question: Does proximity, or
level, of competing supply impact on the
economics of brownfield development?
The final model – the model of development
viability, is estimated after traversing a number
of complicated data transformation and
estimation steps. Site level viability is proxied
using models of new-build house prices and
of housing construction costs. Measures of
competing supply are constructed using data
on detailed planning consents as a base, and
a site level model of build rates as a means of
distributing competing supply over time on a
site by site basis.
The statistical results for the estimated model
of development viability show that a robust
and credible model of viability can be
estimated with reference to macro, local and
site level supply and demand variables. All of
the signs of the variables included in the
model are correct, and a number of the
measures of competing supply are statistically
significant.
The modelling results show a combination of
clear and unexpected results. A strong
relationship appears to exist between
development viability and levels of competing
supply in some local authority areas. In
others, there appears to be no relationship, or
an unexpected one. The potential reasons for
this variety in the modelling results are
examined in more detail in the next chapter.
5: The model of development viability – estimation results
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6: Discussion of the modelling
results
The limitations of the research
methods and results
It is important to recognise the limitations, as
well as the strengths, of the choice of
research method. Earlier in the report it was
noted that quantitative approaches offer the
potential for uncovering complex
relationships, and the reinforcement of
insights using the results of widely accepted
modelling approaches and statistical testing.
However, quantitative approaches do not lend
themselves to the generation of considerable
detail or finely-grained information about
specific case studies or development sites.
The case study areas chosen for the
purposes of this study were designed to
represent a range of housing and land market
circumstances but, as noted earlier, the study
is not designed to be a representative one.
This would require a more substantial sample
of local authority areas.
The study period, 2002-2008, was chosen
partly because it takes in an era of significant
change both in terms of planning policy, and
in terms of house price growth and
development activity. In part, the choice of
study period also reflects pragmatic factors
because prior to 2002, the quality and
availability of digitised planning information
diminishes significantly.
It is important to note that the local authority
areas examined in this study will have been
home to sites with detailed planning
permission granted before the beginning of
the study period. In some cases, these sites
will have been fully developed before, or early
in, the 2002-2008 study period. In other
cases, these prior detailed planning
permissions will have remained either fully
outstanding, or as partially completed
developments, in the early years of the study
period. For this reason, the measures of
competing supply devised for the purpose of
the modelling work in this study should, by
definition, better reflect the reality of
competing supply later rather than earlier in
the study period.
Despite this potential limitation, extensive
experimentation with time-varying effects, and
even use of simplistic ‘time dummy’ variables
did not lead to stronger empirical performance
of the development viability model.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the
measures of competing supply almost
certainly under-count during the early part of
the study period. This strongly suggests that,
TABLE 10: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE COMPETING SUPPLY VARIABLES
Local authority Greenfield Brownfield
Mean Median Mean Median
Corby 0.051 0.051 0.042 0.047
Eastleigh 0.032 0.005 3.891 0.111
Leeds 0.046 0.036 1.139 0.679
Leicester 0.018 0.012 1.226 0.862
North Tyneside 0.058 0.036 0.177 0.124
Southampton 0.002 0.001 0.723 0.446
Suffolk Coastal 0.030 0.008 0.165 0.066
Swindon 0.158 0.140 0.602 0.346
Wigan 0.031 0.020 0.290 0.199
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where significant relationships were uncovered
between competing supply and development
viability, these will be under-estimates.
Interpreting the results
No relationship between competing supply
and development viability was detected in a
number of the case study local authorities.
This does not necessarily mean that such
relationships do not exist in these local
authority areas – it may also reflect the very
low level of greenfield supply in some of these
areas. To illustrate, Table 10 summarises the
greenfield and brownfield competing supply
variables for each of the case study areas.
The competing supply variables are described
in Chapter 4 (see pp 28 and 29 especially) –
they represent a site level index of competing
supply. The variables put less weight on
distant sites than nearby ones because site
capacities are divided by squared distance.
The figures in Table 10 represent local
authority means and medians of these
variables or indexes.
An analysis of Table 10 reveals the following:
> Swindon has the highest level of
competing greenfield supply, followed by
North Tyneside and Corby;
> brownfield sites in Leicester and
Southampton have very low levels of
greenfield competition, as defined in this
study;
> Eastleigh has a very high level of
competing brownfield supply, followed by
Leicester and Leeds; and
> Corby, North Tyneside and Suffolk Coastal
have very low levels of brownfield
competition, as defined in this study.
If we express competing greenfield supply as
a proportion of competing brownfield supply,
a slightly different pictures emerges, as shown
in Table 11.
The four local authorities associated with a
significant relationship between greenfield
competing supply and brownfield viability also
stand out in Table 11. These local authority
areas have among the highest ratios of
competing greenfield to brownfield
competition. This helps to explain why no
relationship was found in Eastleigh, Leeds,
Leicester, Southampton or Wigan. Of course,
there should be no presumption that such a
relationship would not become evident should
these local authorities release substantial
quantities of greenfield land in the future.
However, the figures in Table 11 do not
demonstrate an obvious reason for the finding
6: Discussion of the modelling results
TABLE 11: THE LEVEL OF COMPETING GREENFIELD RELATIVE TO BROWNFIELD SUPPLY
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6: Discussion of the modelling results
of positive effects in two local authorities
(Swindon and Suffolk Coastal) and negative
effects in two (Corby and North Tyneside).
A further limitation of the modelling approach is
inherent in the choice of a relatively small
number of case study local authorities. Site
level planning data were collected for the 9
case study local authorities, but not for local
authorities beyond the study area boundaries.
This means, for example, that competing
planning consents in adjacent local authorities
are not represented in the competing supply
variables. The latter are constructed on an
individual local authority basis, with no cross-
boundary element. This problem is likely to
affect some local authorities differently to
others. For example, the viability of sites in
North Tyneside may logically be affected by the
availability of sites with planning permission in
Newcastle upon Tyne. Equally, strong
interactions may be expected between
Eastleigh and Southampton.
In Suffolk Coastal, there is evidence of
significant greenfield land releases in adjacent
local authority areas in the study period in the
southern part of the district close to Ipswich.
However, the impact of these on the viability of
brownfield development in Suffolk Coastal
cannot be estimated given the approach
adopted to construct measures of competing
supply in this study. It is also possible that the
particular urban form of Swindon, with the
dominant influence of postwar development
and the scattered supply of urban brownfield
sites,18 helps create a positive relationship
between greenfield development and
brownfield land values, especially if major
greenfield releases produce major retail,
leisure, educational, health and associated
investment to the benefit of nearby brownfield
sites.
18 The scattered supply
of brownfield sites in
Swindon may be
associated with the loss
of former employment
sites close to the centre of
the town and their
replacement by greenfield
employment land on the
periphery, thus indicating
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7: Conclusion
This report has presented the first
detailed analysis of how the supply of
greenfield land with planning
permission for residential development
might affect the economics of
brownfield redevelopment. As
indicated in our policy review, the
balance between brownfield and
greenfield development has been an
important policy concern for nearly
two decades, with much speculation
accorded to the likely relationship
between them. It is perhaps therefore
surprising that recent econometric
research has concentrated on the
national and regional levels and has
not drilled down to investigate the
economic forces at work at the local
level. Although a pilot study with
tentative conclusions, we believe that
the econometric model of
development viability at the site
specific level presented here opens up
a new dimension in this important
debate and points to the need for
much fuller analysis of the operation of
local land and housing markets.
Overall results
At the overall level, the model has strong
statistical performance, explaining 64% of
variation (an adjusted R square of 0.64).
Variables nationally and across all nine local
authority areas are statistically significant and
correctly signed. In other words, as one might
expect, the model suggests that brownfield
sites become more viable as interest rates fall
and in locations that are more prosperous
with less deprivation. In this sense, brownfield
development can be regarded as a business
opportunity as much as a policy target and
one whose viability is dependent on a broader
range of economic and political variables,
rather than simply land allocations.
Crucially, across the model as a whole, site-
specific viability falls as competition increases –
measured in terms of the supply of both
planning consents and newly completed
homes. These are important findings since
they both emphasise the need to think carefully
about the capacity of local housing markets to
absorb new supply, both in time and space,
and challenge prevailing thought which pays
insufficient attention to the operation of such
market signals at the local level.
Findings at the local level
At the individual local authority level, a more
complex picture emerged. No relationship
was found between greenfield supply and
brownfield viability in Eastleigh, Leeds,
Leicester, Southampton or Wigan, probably
because competing brownfield supply in each
of the areas far outweighed competing
greenfield supply.
In Suffolk Coastal and Swindon, increased
greenfield supply appeared to make
brownfield development more viable, with a
pronounced effect seen in Suffolk Coastal and
a smaller but still statistically significant effect
evident in Swindon. We are not sure why this
is the case or whether it is due to special
geographical circumstances in the case of
Suffolk Coastal (notably, the strong impact of
the Ipswich housing market just across the
border) or special historical circumstances in
the case of Swindon (significant postwar
expansion of a Victorian railway town where
more recent large-scale greenfield
development may have the potential to enable
settlement-wide improvements in the level and
quality of local services and facilities). As
previously intimated, the results for Suffolk
Coastal may be distorted by the closeness of
the major Ipswich housing market just across
the border to the south and the large scale
greenfield allocations that have been made
within Suffolk Coastal primarily to serve that
market. We have checked for the possibility of
a similar effect in the north part of Suffolk
Coastal in relation to the Lowestoft housing
market, about ten miles to the north of the
district boundary, but can find no evidence of
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7: Conclusions
this, especially since greenfield release in
Suffolk Coastal has been concentrated in the
south, not the north of the district.
In North Tyneside and Corby, however, we
found that the extent of competing greenfield
development had a statistically significant
negative effect on brownfield site viability. In
North Tyneside, we also found a statistically
significant negative effect from competing
brownfield development which, although
much smaller than the greenfield effect, further
emphasises the need to think carefully about
the absorptive capacity of local housing
markets. A similar negative impact of
competing brownfield supply was also
observed in Suffolk Coastal and Wigan,
although the reverse picture was evident in
Eastleigh and Southampton, where competing
brownfield development had a very small, but
positive effect impact on viability.
There are, of course, limitations with this pilot
study, especially since it was restricted to nine
local authority areas over the period 2002-08.
It was not possible, for example, to gain a
fully accurate picture of the extent of
outstanding planning approvals going into the
period, although after testing alternative
modelling strategies, we do not believe this
significantly affected the results. More
importantly perhaps, since we wished to
explore relationships in different parts of
England, we looked individually at nine
separate local authorities. There would indeed
be a case for now looking at a series of
adjoining local authority areas and exploring
how planning consents in one might affect
viability in the others.
A new approach to market signals
Nevertheless, the research results, especially in
North Tyneside and Corby, begin to suggest
statistically that high levels of housebuilding in
one part of a local authority area might well
send market signals that make development
less viable in other parts of the same authority
area. This would point to the need for caution
in thinking carefully about the level and timing
of planning consents, especially in parts of the
country that are not necessarily the strongest
in market terms. From a research perspective,
it suggests that local market analysis can make
an important contribution to the current debate
and that it is unproductive to limit economic
analysis of the relationship between planning
policy and housing markets to the national and
regional levels alone. More importantly,
perhaps from a policy and practice
perspective, these findings indicate that there
are more dimensions to the market signals
perspective than currently acknowledged, that
they are potentially more complex than
previously thought and that they do not
necessarily all point in the same direction.
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Corby was transformed from a small Northamptonshire village into an industrial town by the arrival 
of steel-making in the mid 1930s. It expanded further from the 1950s onwards following designation 
as a new town. After the steelworks closed in the 1980s, redevelopment was assisted by Enterprise 
Zone status, which attracted more varied inward investment. Essentially, still a Midlands 
manufacturing town even at the turn of the 21st century, Corby has since embarked on a radical 
change of direction. Along with its immediate neighbours, it now constitutes the North 
Northamptonshire growth area2. This is itself the northernmost tip of the broader Milton Keynes and 
South Midlands growth area, identified in the Sustainable Communities Plan (Office of the Deputy 





























Figure 1: Annual housebuilding rates in Corby 2000-08 
 
 
According to the North Northants Development Company (the main public sector agency driving 
forward its transformation), North Northamptonshire’s population is due to rise from 285,000 in 2001 
                                                
1  The various graphs in this section are derived from Department for Communities and Local Government 
statistics on housebuilding completions by local authority district up to the end of 2008 and from theLand Use 
Change Statistics (2007) which give detailed information for each local authority area on the proportion of 
dwellings built on brownfield (previously developed) land and the density of new residential development. We 
do not include housing conversions in our brownfield analysis, since no such estimates are provided in LUCS at 
a regional or local authority level. As a result, there may be some divergence between the brownfield/gr enfield 
split we report below for each local authority area and those reported in the authority’s own publications which 
may allow for conversions. 
2 The other three local authority districts in the ‘North Northamptonshire growth area are Kettering, 
Wellingborough and East Northamptonshire. 
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to 370,000 in 2021. Corby will take the lion’s share of this growth, with its population expected to 
grow from 53,400 in 2001 to 86,400 in 2021 and thence on to almost 98,000 in 2026. As Figure 1 
shows, housebuilding in Corby has already begun to i crease significantly.  
 
Such rapid expansion places heavy reliance on greenfield land, with major urban expansions already 
underway. Others are now planned to the north east (5,100 new homes between 2006 and 2021) and 
west (4,000 new homes between 2011 and 2021) of Corby’s existing area. 
 
Alongside residential development, it is intended to revitalise the town centre, significantly increas 
employment, provide a range of new leisure facilities and improve local transport. In the latter 
context, a new railway station with direct connections to central London was opened early in 2009, 
reinforcing the belief that much of Corby’s expansio  will serve the Greater London employment 
market. Indeed, Corby’s attraction to London commuters was conveyed in a recent marketing 
campaign on the London Underground by the less than subtle slogan ‘More for your money: Homes 
in Corby, the next property hotspot, cost 154% lessthan London’. 
 
What is perhaps most surprising about the North Northamptonshire growth area is that its core 
strategy has set a brownfield target of 30%, when recent performance, at least in Corby, has been far 
below this. For as Figure 2 shows, Corby’s current housing growth has been driven very largely by 
greenfield development, with an only marginal increas  in density and the balance between greenfield 
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Figure 2: Characteristics of recent residential development in Corby 
 
 
According to an urban housing capacity study, undertak n in 2004 for Corby Borough Council 
(2005), brownfield sites had the potential to yield some 2,138 new homes over the 2001 to 2021 
period or roughly 13% of the 16,800 dwellings that were expected to be built over that time. From a 
research perspective, Corby then presents an interesting example of dominant greenfield expansion, 
which allows the likely impact on the development prospects of the much smaller brownfield supply 





Eastleigh is a former railway town in South Hampshire lying between Southampton and Winchester 
and the main centre of a district that has seen significant recent housing growth, especially at locations 
such as Hedge End, West End and Fair Oak. Both the M3 and M27 traverse the district, which also 
contains Southampton International Airport. 
 
By 2007, Eastleigh’s population was estimated to have reached about 120,000 accommodated in a 
dwelling stock of just over 51,500. A further 7,000 dwellings are planned to be built in Eastleigh over 
the 2006-2026 period on top of the 6,000 to be constructed at the strategic development area of Hedge 
End, which straddles the district boundary. The borough’s population is thus expected to reach almost 





























Figure 3: Annual housebuilding rates in Eastleigh 2000-2008 
 
As Figure 3 shows, housebuilding rates in Eastleigh increased significantly in the second half of the 
decade, with a peak of 800 dwellings completed in 2004. Although subsequent years have not 
matched this achievement, completion rates at the end of the period still remained three or four times 
higher than those achieved in 2001 and 2002. 
 
The Eastleigh experience demonstrates convincingly that it is possible to significantly increase 
residential development while maintaining and even improving on a high brownfield ratio. 
Redevelopment of former industrial land, such as the transformation by Barratt Homes of the large 
redundant Pirelli factory into a new residential community known as Park 21, ensured a rising supply 
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Figure 4: Characteristics of recent residential development in Eastleigh 
 
 
Yet, as Figure 4 reveals, the key to Eastleigh’s success was an almost doubling in the density of new 
dwellings per hectare, which meant that only limited additional land was necessary as a whole to 
produce the substantial rise in completion rates in the latter part of the decade. However, greater 
reliance on planned greenfield releases in later years, for example at South Street, Eastleigh and 




Leeds is one of the UK’s main regional centres, with a population of 715,000. Over recent decades, its 
economy has been transformed from its previous reliance on manufacturing (which accounted for 
about 75% of the Leeds workforce in the 1950s compared to less than 10% today) by rapid service 
sector growth especially in retailing and financial services. Its administrative boundary extends well
beyond the main urban area of Leeds itself to cover a b oader rural hinterland containing outlying 
towns along with numerous small villages.  
 
The city sits at the centre of the Leeds City Region – a partnership forged with ten neighbouring local 
authorities with the intention (City Region Development Programme, Leeds City Council, 2006: 2) to 
‘develop an internationally recognised city region; to raise our economic performance; to spread 
prosperity across the whole of our city region, andto promote a better quality of life for all of those 
who live and work here.’  
 
The Leeds Unitary Development Plan, which was finally dopted in 2001 after a 12-year period of 
preparation, made provision for 28,500 new dwellings between 1991 and 2006, equivalent to a net 
increase of about 1,900 each year. The subsequent 2006 review of the plan, reflecting the slightly 
higher requirements of regional planning guidance raised this figure to 1,930 dwellings per annum 
during the 1998-2016 period. The review sought to concentrate new dvelopment on brownfield sites 
in the urban core of Leeds, including the nearby towns of Morley, Rothwell, Pudsey, Horsforth and 
Aireborough or in the outlying towns of Otley and Wetherby.  
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Three strategic brownfield developments were planned at Holbeck Village, Hunslet Riverside and 
Allerton Bywater, along with a fourth greenfield location at Sharp Lane, Middleton in the south of the 
city and a fifth scheme known as the East Leeds Extension, which was seen as a major potential 
greenfield development in later years.  
 
More recent planning strategies envisage a significant upward step in housing delivery. The Regional 
Spatial Strategy for Yorkshire and The Humber, for example, published in 2008, sets an annual net 
target of 2,260 units between 2004 and 2008 and 4,300 units between 2008 and 2026, which translate 
into gross requirements of 2,700 and 4,300 units per annum respectively. These targets have been 



























Figure 5: Annual housebuilding rates in Leeds 2000-2008 
 
 
Annual completions data show that the Leeds housing market has been highly buoyant in recent 
times. Early in this decade, Leeds produced a consistent output of almost 2,000 new dwellings per 
annum, but as Figure 5 shows, this increased significa tly in later years to a maximum figure of over 
3,600 completions in 2007 at the height of the housing boom. 
 
Despite much higher rates of housebuilding in Leeds towards the end of the decade, land-take actually 
fell, primarily as a result of an increase in the density of new dwellings from 35 per hectare in the 
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Figure 6: Characteristics of recent residential development in Leeds 
 
 
Leeds has been at the forefront of the recent boom in high density city centre apartments, with over 
5,700 completed in the 2003-2007 period and a further 3,800 under construction at the end of that 
period (Unsworth, Town Planning Review, 2007). However, as Figure 6 shows, while brownfield 
development became thus even more dominant later in he decade, the sheer scale of new homes built 
each year in Leeds meant that greenfield development remained important in absolute terms, even 




Leicester is the largest city in the East Midlands, with a population of 285,000. Although an important 
regional service centre, its manufacturing base remains significant at approximately 24% of the 
workforce. The city boundaries are tightly drawn, with some important outer suburbs located in the 
adjoining districts of Blaby, Charnwood and Oadby and Wigston, which puts the overall population of 
the wider Leicester urban area at around 440,000. 
 
Some 19,000 new dwellings were planned to be built in Leicester itself over the 1996 to 2016 period, 
according to the Leicestershire, Leicester and Rutland Structure Plan (2005). Drawing on the findings 
of an urban capacity study, the subsequent City of Leicester Local Plan (2006) suggested that 69% of 
the new housing requirement could be built on brownfield sites. However, it also noted that this target 
might be difficult to maintain in the later stages of the plan, if increased greenfield development were 
to take place at the major peripheral locations of Hamilton and Beaumont Leys. Indeed, the plan 
allocated new land for 2,830 new dwellings on major greenfield extensions at Ashton Green and 
Hamilton, which the local authority considered essential to meet structure plan requirements, despite 
the overall priority accorded to brownfield development. 
 
The draft Regional Spatial Strategy for the East Midlands, published in 2006, suggested an increased 
annual housebuilding rate of 1,180 in Leicester over th  2001 to 2026 period, within the context of a 
60% brownfield target for the region as a whole. In September 2006, however, Leicester was included 
in the ‘three cities and three counties’ growth point of Derby, Leicester and Nottingham, with the 
shared commitment to provide an additional 81,500 homes across the growth point as a whole by 
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2016. Nevertheless, the final Regional Spatial Strategy for the East Midlands, published in 2009, 
raised the annual housebuilding target Leicester ovthe 2001 to 2026 period by only 100 to 1,280. 
According to a housing land availability assessment carried out by Roger Tym and Partners (2007, 
Executive Summary, paragraph 5) for the respective local authorities, in the Leicester urban area as a
whole ‘The total level of average output will have to double what has been achieved over the last five 
years.’ Moreover, it suggested that across the urban area as a whole, brownfield development would 
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Figure 7: Annual housebuilding rates in Leicester 2000-2008 
 
 
Recent annual completions data for Leicester itself hows that the production of new homes peaked 
much earlier than in other case study locations, with output reaching a maximum of 1,000 in 2004. As 
Figure 7 indicates, the subsequent downward trend in output meant that production by 2008 had 
returned to the much lower figures recorded for 2001 and 2003. Against recent achievements, even 
the draft Regional Spatial Strategy proposal of 1,180 new homes to be built annually seems highly 
ambitious. 
 
Looking in more detail at the development pattern in Leicester (see Figure 8) reveals a greater 
reliance on greenfield development in the later part of the decade, with only a limited increase evident 
in the density of new dwellings per hectare. Leicester found it difficult to reconcile much higher levels 
of output with maintaining its earlier emphasis on brownfield development and thus presents almost 
the opposite picture to that encountered in Eastleigh. As intimated in the various planning documents, 
it is possible that greenfield sites will need to make a stronger contribution to housing production in 
the years ahead, if the city’s status as a growth point is indeed to be evident in some of the target 
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North Tyneside lies immediately to the east of Newcastle and its main towns of North Shields, 
Wallsend and Whitley Bay form part of a continuous built-up area. Its 2001 population stood at 
192,000, which represented a decline of 1.8% over th  previous decade, much lower than had been 
experienced in the 1980s and 1970s. The Unitary Development Plan of 2002 envisaged future 
population growth and included proposals for major greenfield development at Backworth, Shiremoor 
and West Allotment in the A19 growth corridor northwards to Northumberland, to be served by a new 
district centre and a new station on the Metro line 
 
The Regional Spatial Strategy for the North East of England, approved in 2008, envisaged the 
development of some 7,800 new homes in North Tyneside between 2004-2005 and 2020-2021, 
equivalent to an annual figure of about 460. Almost immediately, however, North Tyneside’s 
designation as a growth point later in 2008 added over 1,000 dwellings to the Regional Spatial 
Strategy and lifted the annual requirement to 586. In the current recession, there must some doubt 
about the delivery of such ambitious plans in what is not the strongest housing market studied in the 
research. 
 
Looking at recent housing production in North Tynesid , it is difficult to see any consistent trend 
although as Figure 9 suggests, the district seems to have experienced a much sharper decline in 



































Figure 9: Annual housebuilding rates in North Tyneside 2000-2008 
 
Despite highly variable rates of new housebuilding, overall land-take in North Tyneside remained 
remarkably consistent between the earlier and laterperiods shown in Figure 10. This was because the 
impact of a relative switch in favour of greenfield development seems to have been cancelled out by a 
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Southampton is a major freestanding city of 231,000 people on the south coast and a longstanding 
maritime and service centre. It has a substantial legacy of brownfield land as a result of the decline in 
shipbuilding and ship repair and in traditional industry such as the manufacture of sub-sea cables. Th 
city is already largely built up and has little room for peripheral expansion within its tight 
administrative boundary, indeed, parts of the neighbouring districts of Eastleigh and Test Valley serve 
as important suburban areas for Southampton 
 
The Hampshire Structure Plan 1996 envisaged an annual ho sebuilding rate of 500 new homes within 
in the city or 7,330 in total up to 2011. However, the buoyant economy and the unexpected 
availability of large brownfield sites have caused this rate of building to be exceeded in recent years 
and later policy documents thus propose a higher rat  of development in future. As a result, according 
to the draft South East Plan for South Hampshire 2008, some 16,300 new homes are expected to be 
built in Southampton between 2006 and 2026, which is equivalent to 815 per annum. 
 
Southampton’s Local Development Framework Core Strategy, also published in 2008, places 
continued importance on major residential development in the city centre, with about 5,400 new 
homes to be built there over the plan period and a further 6.400 to be dispersed on smaller sites within 
residential neighbourhoods. Crucially, in view of Southampton’s tight urban boundary, there are no 
































Figure 11: Annual housebuilding rates in Southampton 2000-2008 
 
As Figure 11 shows, Southampton saw an upward trend in completion rates in the middle part of the 
period, which remained high until the recession began to have a serious impact in 2008. City centre 
apartment building was particularly important in the middle part of the decade and that market may 
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Figure 12: Characteristics of recent residential development in Southampton 
 
Looking in more detail at the development pattern in Southampton (see Figure 12) demonstrates the 
crucial importance of the rise in the density of new dwellings from 52 per hectare in 2000-2 03 to 92 
per hectare in 2004-2007. This helped reconcile increased housing production with the further fall in 
the importance of greenfield compared to brownfield development and meant that overall land-take 
was actually lower in the later part of the study period. The city’s legacy of brownfield land is 
expected to continue to provide a steady stream of development sites, such as the former Vosper 
Thornycroft industrial complex (now remained Woolstn – Centenary Quay) which is expected to 
yield 1,600 new homes and Royal Pier – Mayflower Park, where around another thousand dwellings 





Suffolk Coastal is a predominantly rural authority, mmediately to the north east of Ipswich in East 
Anglia, although some of the outer suburbs of Ipswich actually fall within its boundary. In settlement 
terms, however, the district is dominated by the port of Felixstowe on its south eastern area, which 
contains just under a quarter of the district’s population of 122,000 in 2006. Like many similar areas, 
Suffolk Coastal has seen significant population growth in recent decades, with an increase of just 
under 30% in the last 30 years. The southern part of Suffolk Coastal is now part of the Haven 
Gateway Partnership, a designated growth point covering the ports of Felixstowe, Harwich, Ipswich, 
Mistley and their surrounding areas. 
 
Housing growth is likely to continue in Suffolk Coast l for the foreseeable future, with the East of 
England Regional Spatial Strategy, approved in 2008, expecting to see provision of an additional 
10,200 dwellings in the district over the period 2001-2021. Of these, 3,000 will be concentrated on the 
edge of Ipswich, mainly on major greenfield allocations. The other main area of search will be around 






























Figure 13: Annual housebuilding rates in Suffolk Coastal 2000-2008 
 
 
Unusually, Suffolk Coastal presents almost a bell curve distribution in recent housing production with 
a steady increase in output (apart from 2004), reaching a peak of over 600 new homes built in 2006 
and then rapidly falling away as the recession began to bite. The Regional Spatial Strategy target 
means that production will need to settle at the higher levels of the bell curve in order to deliver the
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Figure 14: Characteristics of recent residential development in Suffolk Coastal 
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A closer inspection of recent development patterns in Suffolk Coastal reveals a marginal increase in 
the relative importance of greenfield development in the later period of the survey, possibly associated 
with the peak completions years of 2005 and 2006. However, as Table 14 demonstrates, a small rise 
in the density of new dwellings per hectare seems to have acted as a counterweight and ensured that 
overall land-take fell slightly in the later period. 
 
While the Local Development Framework Core Strategy identifies some minor opportunities for 
brownfield development within existing towns and villages, it comments that potential in the main 
urban area of Felixstowe is limited, primarily because of the shortage of redundant sites in an 
expanding port and the constraints imposed by flood risk in the context of climate change. It is 
therefore likely that Suffolk Coastal will become increasingly dependent on greenfield development 





Swindon has been the most significant growth locatin in Wiltshire for some decades. Strategically 
located alongside the M4 and on the mainline train oute between London and Bristol, its expansion 
can be traced back to designation under the Town Development Act 1952. Under more locally-based 
policies, the town’s population has grown from 129,000 to 160,000 over the past 25 years within a 
total for the borough as a whole of 189,500. In recent years, the focus of peripheral expansion has 
been on the Northern Development Area, which saw almost 5,500 houses completed between 2001 
and 2008. Apart from Corby, Swindon registered the most noticeable increase in housebuilding of any 
case study location in the first decade of this century, with over 2000 completions recorded in 2007, a 

























Figure 15: Annual housebuilding rates in Swindon 2000-2008 
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In 2007, Swindon was designated as one of the Government’s first round of growth points. This 
brought in additional investment of over £3 million in the first year. Priorities include town centre 
regeneration, which will provide around 3.000 additional homes, the major new development of 
Wichelstowe to the south of Swindon bringing a furthe  4,500 dwellings, the Commonhead 
development including 1,800 dwellings around a new university campus, completion of the Northern 
Development Area by 2011 and ultimately a strategic urban extension to the east capable of 
accommodating up to 12,000 dwellings. It is therefor  no surprise that the Draft Regional Spatial 
Strategy envisages the development of 35,000 new dwellings in the Swindon area between 2006 and 
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Figure 16: Characteristics of recent residential development in Swindon 
 
 
Interestingly, as Figure 16 shows, the recent rapid rise in Swindon’s housing output was achieved 
alongside a marginal increase in the relative importance of brownfield development, although no 
significant increase was recorded in density. A consta t flow of relatively small brownfield sites 
appears to have accounted for this recent increase sinc  the small geographical area occupied by 
Swindon prior to major postwar expansion did not contain large areas of industrial employment, apart 





Wigan is at the north-western corner of the Greater Manchester conurbation and has a population of 
just over 300,000. It is an extensive borough in land terms, comprising the town itself and several 
adjoining settlements, most notably the towns of Ashton-in-Makerfield, Hindley, Ince-in-Makerfield 
and Leigh. The district is well connected, being on the M6 and the west coast main train line and has 
been a popular development location in recent years. Like many similar areas, Wigan has suffered 




Regional Planning Guidance for the North West, published in 2003, set Wigan a housebuilding target 
of 510 new dwellings a year, which allowing for demolitions of around 100 annually, translated into a 
net addition of 410. This level was incorporated within the Unitary Development Plan for Wigan, last 
revised in 2006. However, as Figure 17 shows, residential completions in Wigan saw an upward 
trajectory from 2002, reaching a peak of over 1,600 new homes built in 2007. The revised Regional 
Spatial Strategy, approved in 2008, took advantage of the higher level of housebuilding and set a new 
net target of 978 completions per annum. However, this may not be achievable in the immediate 
future as the impact of the recession on housebuilding in 2008 seems to have been felt much harder in 




























Figure 17: Annual housebuilding rates in Wigan 2000-2008 
 
 
Against a Regional Spatial Strategy brownfield target of 80% for Greater Manchester, Wigan saw a 
minor shift in favour of greenfield development in the later period, although brownfield development 
remained dominant. Nevertheless, as Figure 18 also reveals, a significant rise in the density of new 
dwellings from 27 per hectare in 2000-2 03 to 43 per hectare in 2004-2007 meant that this relative 
switch towards greenfield development was achieved alongside a slight reduction in overall land-take. 
However, in the Local Development Framework Core Strategy Issues and Options Report, published 
in 2008, the local authority expressed concern at the extensive recent development of apartments in 
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Greenfield development was dominant in only three of the nine case study locations - Corby, Suffolk 
Coastal and Swindon and in the last two of these, brownfield development was still significant in 
absolute terms. Corby was thus unusual because its growth area status was combined with a very 
limited brownfield output. In contrast, Eastleigh, Leeds, Southampton and Wigan were heavily reliant 
on brownfield development, especially in the later pa t of the study period, although in the case of 
Leeds, in particular, the sheer amount of new housing built meant that greenfield land was still 
significant in absolute terms. Both Leicester and North Tyneside present more mixed pictures, with a 
more even balance between greenfield and brownfield resi ential development, especially in the later 
period. As a whole, then, the case studies provide a useful variation in circumstances to allow the 
potential link between greenfield development and brownfield viability to be explored in detail. 
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Appendix 2: The Development Site Build Rate Model 
 
The build rate model is very simple in construction. It is estimated using Emap-Glenigan data for the 
period 2002-2008 and draws on information on projected development periods available in these 
digitised planning records. The model is driven largely by the number of units in a development, 
together with the split between the number of housing units and flatted units proposed on site. A 
quadratic term (squared units) allows for the concept of economics/diseconomies of scale. The 
detailed results are shown below. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient t statistic 
Constant 9.141 219.65 *** 
Squared number of units -3.2E-05 -12.32 *** 
Number of flats to be constructed on site 0.059 58.2  *** 
Number of houses to be constructed on site 0.061 68.09 *** 
Development comprises only flats -1.013 -18.84 *** 
 
Note: *** denotes significant at the 1% level 
 
Adjusted R square:  0.763 
F statistic:   3599.431 
Number of observations: 4480 
 
 
The results indicate a robust model, with an adjusted R square of 0.763. The number of both flats and 
houses proposed in a particular development increases the expected development period at different 
rates. Meanwhile, the quadratic term is both statistically significant and negatively signed. This 




Appendix 3: The Construction Cost Model 
 
The construction cost model is also very simple in co struction. Construction cost estimates 
were available in just under 8,000 relevant (residential development) observations in the 
dataset. Although extensive experimentation with more complex specifications was carried 
out, the final model is driven by a limited set of explanatory variables as shown below. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient t statistic 
Constant 335,676 26.05 *** 
Number of flats 29,465 127.20 *** 
Number of houses 40,154 201.65 *** 
Number of luxury houses 40,715 77.68 *** 
Number of bungalows 25,935 29.52 *** 
Squared number of units 51.46 141.40 *** 
Adjustment for 2004 313,841 6.85 *** 
Adjustment for 2005 543,779 12.50 *** 
Adjustment for 2006 464,763 10.90 *** 
Adjustment for 2007 563,641 13.80 *** 
Adjustment for 2008 488,640 10.65 *** 
Adjustment for London Government Office region 123,315 3.92 *** 
Adjustment for North East Government Office region 87,423 2.29 ** 
Adjustment for North West Government Office region -49,437 -2.00 ** 
Adjustment for West Midlands Government Office 
region -84,759 -2.52 ** 
Adjustment for Yorkshire & The Humber Government 
Office region -60,238 -2.48 ** 
 
Note: *** denotes statistically significant at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level. 
 
Adjusted R square:  0.946 
F statistic:   9175.85 
Number of observations: 7835 
 
As the results show, residential development construction costs can be explained with regards 
to the number of flats and houses proposed on site. Bungalows and units described as luxury 
houses have a slightly different impact on total construction costs than units simply described 
as houses. A quadratic term (squared number of units) is also statistically significant and this 
indicates that per unit construction costs rise with development size. 
 
The model is estimated over a number of years (2002- 8). Time dummy variables capture 
the effects of construction cost inflation. The model initially assumes that all projects take 
place in 2002. The variable for 2003 was not statistically significant and so it drops out of the 
model. The coefficients for the 2004-2008 time dummy variables capture the higher 
construction costs in those years, compared with 2002 and 2003. 
 
A set of regional variables captures differences in co struction costs between government 
office regions. Although most of these are statistically significant, the impact on overall 
predicted construction costs is relatively small, except in the case of very small sites. 
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The statistical results allow the prediction of construction costs related to time period, 
regional location and broad description of development proposal. For example, the following 
table summarises the prediction of construction costs associated with hypothetical 
developments of 40 flats, 40 luxury houses and a combination of 20 flats and 20 non luxury 




Site of 40 flats 
(construction costs in £s) 
Site of 40 luxury houses 
(construction costs in £s) 
Site of 20 flats 
and 20 houses 
(construction costs in £s) 
2002 1,596,605 2,046,626 1,810,389 
2003 1,596,605 2,046,626 1,810,389 
2004 1,910,446 2,360,467 2,124,230 
2005 2,140,385 2,590,405 2,354,168 
2006 2,061,369 2,511,389 2,275,152 
2007 2,160,247 2,610,267 2,374,040 
2008 2,085,246 2,535,266 2,299,040 
 
 
If the predictions take in the regional variation in costs revealed by the government office 
region dummy variables then the following predicted construction costs are obtained for a 
site comprising 20 flats and 20 non luxury houses for the year 2008: 
 
 
Government Office region 
Site of 20 flats and 20 houses, 2008 
(construction costs in £s) 
East Midlands 2,299,029 
East of England 2,299,029 
London 2,422,344 
North East 2,386,452 
North West 2,249,592 
South East 2,299,029 
South West 2,299,029 
West Midlands 2,214,270 




Appendix 4: The New-Build House Price Model 
 
The house price models are estimated separately for each local authority area, and form part 
of wider results from a different, unfunded research project. Drawing on Nationwide Building 
Society data, the models are estimated for the 2002- 7 study period (complete data for 
2008 was not available at the point of model estimation). 
 
The models follow the standard convention hedonic house price conventions. Time dummy 
variables capture house price trends over time. A range of variables describes physical 
housing characteristics including, for example, floor area, number of bedrooms, number of 
bathrooms and parking arrangements. 
 
The models provide a unique level of additional detail in terms of spatial variation in house 
prices. This is achieved partly by the separate estimation of models at local authority area 
level, and partly using a multi-level model design. This multi-level approach allows the 
estimation of a neighbourhood price premium (at Ward level). This, combined with the new-
build premium, permits the model to be used for thepurpose of estimating new-build 
property prices by property type and location with the local authority area. The estimation 
results are shown below, for reference purposes. 
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Corby house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.023 0.068 161.11 *** 
2003 premium 0.225 0.026 8.65 *** 
2004 premium 0.384 0.028 13.64 *** 
2005 premium 0.436 0.033 13.15 *** 
2006 premium 0.551 0.027 20.58 *** 
2007 premium 0.641 0.027 24.12 *** 
Square feet 0.0004439 0.0000604 7.35 *** 
Square feet2 7.85E-08 4.31E-08 1.82 * 
Built before 1971 -0.075 0.024 -3.2 *** 
New-build 0.095 0.05 1.91 * 
No central heating -0.155 0.061 -2.55 ** 
Single garage 0.094 0.019 4.89 *** 
Double garage 0.229 0.043 5.39 *** 
Detached 0.102 0.027 3.74 *** 
Terraced -0.135 0.022 -6.26 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.282 0.054 5.21 *** 
Flat -0.285 0.061 -4.63 *** 
Converted flat -0.277 0.106 -2.61 *** 
Leasehold -0.288 0.129 -2.24 ** 
Second bedroom 0.104 0.052 2.02 ** 
Third bedroom 0.145 0.049 2.98 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.112 0.052 2.16 ** 
More than one bathroom 0.05 0.024 2.08 ** 
Wald chi2(22) 1941.28 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 66.196811 ***   
Ward premium 0.1540789 0.0337397   
LR test vs. linear regression: 120.07 ***   
Observations 460    
Groups (wards) 13    
 
 




Eastleigh house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.755 0.022 524.62 *** 
2003 premium 0.122 0.011 11.48 *** 
2004 premium 0.202 0.011 18.11 *** 
2005 premium 0.225 0.011 20.06 *** 
2006 premium 0.248 0.01 25.21 *** 
2007 premium 0.339 0.01 33.48 *** 
Square feet 0.0003642 0.0000163 22.28 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.052 0.009 -5.8 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.023 0.009 -2.64 *** 
New-build 0.117 0.023 4.99 *** 
Double garage 0.066 0.013 4.93 *** 
Detached 0.161 0.01 16.51 *** 
Terraced -0.065 0.009 -7.59 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.26 0.016 16.23 *** 
Semi-detached bungalow 0.063 0.029 2.13 ** 
Flat -0.204 0.018 -11.57 *** 
Converted flat -0.15 0.021 -7.1 *** 
Leasehold -0.081 0.03 -2.69 *** 
Second bedroom 0.116 0.015 7.69 *** 
Third bedroom 0.155 0.017 8.9 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.209 0.023 9.24 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.21 0.033 6.43 *** 
More than one bathroom 0.027 0.008 3.28 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 10723.47 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 1014.4006 ***   
Ward premium 0.0540767 0.0096691   
LR test vs. linear regression: 190.43 ***   
Observations 1546    
Groups (wards) 19    
 
 24 
Leeds house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.374 0.04 281.04 *** 
2003 premium 0.194 0.012 16.38 *** 
2004 premium 0.36 0.013 28.67 *** 
2005 premium 0.426 0.013 33.07 *** 
2006 premium 0.472 0.011 44.56 *** 
2007 premium 0.532 0.011 49.78 *** 
Square feet 0.0004468 0.0000209 21.37 *** 
Square feet2 -3.56E-08 1.75E-08 -2.04 ** 
Built before 1971 -0.138 0.012 -11.95 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.104 0.016 -6.69 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.063 0.016 -3.99 *** 
No central heating -0.133 0.012 -11.03 *** 
Partial central heating -0.073 0.022 -3.29 *** 
Single garage 0.078 0.008 9.83 *** 
Double garage 0.212 0.019 10.96 *** 
Detached 0.112 0.012 9.75 *** 
Terraced -0.092 0.008 -10.91 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.285 0.035 8.07 *** 
Semi-detached bungalow 0.133 0.026 5.11 *** 
Flat -0.073 0.02 -3.63 *** 
Converted flat 0.054 0.023 2.37 ** 
Second bedroom 0.094 0.02 4.72 *** 
Third bedroom 0.148 0.022 6.68 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.212 0.026 8.15 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.268 0.035 7.61 *** 
More than one bathroom 0.023 0.009 2.48 ** 
Wald chi2(22) 11091.99 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 635.38199 ***   
Ward premium 0.1769297 0.022588   
LR test vs. linear regression: 1449.42 ***   
Observations 3665    
Groups (wards) 33    
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Leicester house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.267 0.048 236.46 *** 
2003 premium 0.269 0.015 17.57 *** 
2004 premium 0.471 0.017 27.83 *** 
2005 premium 0.496 0.017 28.63 *** 
2006 premium 0.509 0.015 34.74 *** 
2007 premium 0.561 0.014 39.17 *** 
Square feet 0.0005815 0.0000327 17.8 *** 
Square feet2 -5.80E-08 2.74E-08 -2.12 ** 
Built before 1971 -0.107 0.017 -6.43 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.146 0.023 -6.35 *** 
New-build 0.183 0.038 4.78 *** 
No central heating -0.057 0.025 -2.26 ** 
Single garage 0.058 0.012 4.77 *** 
Double garage 0.091 0.036 2.49 ** 
Detached 0.116 0.02 5.75 *** 
Terraced -0.119 0.012 -9.6 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.201 0.041 4.88 *** 
Flat -0.226 0.028 -8.1 *** 
Converted flat -0.151 0.037 -4.05 *** 
Leasehold -0.155 0.058 -2.67 *** 
Second bedroom 0.084 0.031 2.74 *** 
Third bedroom 0.099 0.035 2.85 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.135 0.044 3.11 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.154 0.056 2.74 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 5796.54 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 375.1886 ***   
Ward premium 0.1299073 0.0206818   
LR test vs. linear regression: 536.71 ***   
Observations 1295    
Groups (wards) 22    
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North Tyneside house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.191 0.048 231.21 *** 
2003 premium 0.279 0.016 17.66 *** 
2004 premium 0.495 0.017 28.73 *** 
2005 premium 0.582 0.018 32.93 *** 
2006 premium 0.597 0.015 40.72 *** 
2007 premium 0.63 0.015 43.21 *** 
Square feet 0.0004687 0.0000212 22.1 *** 
Built before 1971 -0.213 0.016 -13.62 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.176 0.024 -7.43 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.085 0.024 -3.49 *** 
New-build 0.067 0.041 1.64  
No central heating -0.144 0.024 -6.1 *** 
Single garage 0.131 0.011 11.39 *** 
Double garage 0.187 0.026 7.24 *** 
Detached 0.079 0.02 4.06 *** 
Terraced -0.106 0.013 -8.41 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.263 0.062 4.24 *** 
Semi-detached bungalow 0.183 0.034 5.35 *** 
Flat -0.237 0.019 -12.74 *** 
Converted flat -0.182 0.022 -8.13 *** 
Leasehold 0.036 0.018 1.94 * 
Second bedroom 0.134 0.024 5.71 *** 
Third bedroom 0.183 0.025 7.28 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.186 0.031 6.02 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.145 0.043 3.35 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 7371.78 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 295.22632 ***   
Ward premium 0.1717323 0.028408   
LR test vs. linear regression: 736.96 ***   
Observations 1742    
Groups (wards) 20    
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Southampton house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.766 0.03 390.04 *** 
2003 premium 0.156 0.011 13.84 *** 
2004 premium 0.257 0.011 23.17 *** 
2005 premium 0.251 0.012 21.33 *** 
2006 premium 0.305 0.01 30.42 *** 
2007 premium 0.37 0.01 36.01 *** 
Square feet 0.0004956 0.0000215 23.05 *** 
Square feet2 -4.64E-08 2.05E-08 -2.26 ** 
Built before 1971 -0.161 0.012 -13.34 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.145 0.018 -8.1 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.067 0.015 -4.47 *** 
No central heating -0.058 0.012 -4.79 *** 
Partial central heating -0.039 0.011 -3.39 *** 
Single garage 0.056 0.007 7.56 *** 
Double garage 0.077 0.031 2.47 ** 
Detached 0.106 0.011 9.71 *** 
Terraced -0.074 0.008 -8.79 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.227 0.022 10.16 *** 
Flat -0.169 0.013 -12.73 *** 
Converted flat -0.126 0.015 -8.16 *** 
Second bedroom 0.099 0.015 6.67 *** 
Third bedroom 0.127 0.019 6.68 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.196 0.025 7.77 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.194 0.045 4.26 *** 
More than one bathroom 0.026 0.008 3.14 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 9333.24 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 1000.8822 ***   
Ward premium 0.0820197 0.0155144   
LR test vs. linear regression: 364.79 ***   
Observations 2057    
Groups (wards) 16    
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Suffolk Coastal house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.444 0.043 267.13 *** 
2003 premium 0.13 0.018 7.12 *** 
2004 premium 0.283 0.019 14.76 *** 
2005 premium 0.299 0.02 14.68 *** 
2006 premium 0.348 0.019 18.53 *** 
2007 premium 0.428 0.019 22.78 *** 
Square feet 0.0004573 0.0000233 19.62 *** 
Built before 1971 0.053 0.014 3.91 *** 
No central heating -0.064 0.027 -2.4 ** 
Partial central heating -0.048 0.019 -2.47 ** 
Single garage 0.061 0.014 4.44 *** 
Double garage 0.121 0.024 5.11 *** 
Detached 0.134 0.016 8.18 *** 
Terraced -0.048 0.017 -2.86 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.184 0.024 7.8 *** 
Flat -0.135 0.041 -3.27 *** 
Converted flat -0.161 0.042 -3.87 *** 
Leasehold -0.273 0.121 -2.25 ** 
Second bedroom 0.14 0.032 4.39 *** 
Third bedroom 0.176 0.034 5.19 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.202 0.038 5.24 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.203 0.049 4.13 *** 
More than one bathroom 0.044 0.014 3.14 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 4451.95 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 255.09188 ***   
Ward premium 0.1193392 0.016462   
LR test vs. linear regression: 220.65 ***   
Observations 996    
Groups (wards) 34    
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Swindon house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 11.568 0.035 334.53 *** 
2003 premium 0.078 0.008 9.29 *** 
2004 premium 0.154 0.008 18.16 *** 
2005 premium 0.173 0.009 19.97 *** 
2006 premium 0.23 0.008 29.47 *** 
2007 premium 0.288 0.008 34.88 *** 
Square feet 0.000296 0.0000179 16.53 *** 
Square feet2 4.07E-08 1.36E-08 3 *** 
Built before 1971 -0.043 0.009 -4.77 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.055 0.01 -5.45 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.024 0.01 -2.48 ** 
New-build 0.054 0.017 3.15 *** 
No central heating -0.062 0.012 -4.95 *** 
Partial central heating -0.07 0.012 -5.91 *** 
Single garage 0.025 0.006 4.3 *** 
Double garage 0.133 0.012 11.32 *** 
Detached 0.107 0.008 13.6 *** 
Terraced -0.078 0.007 -11.9 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.209 0.021 9.8 *** 
Semi-detached bungalow 0.093 0.02 4.75 *** 
Flat -0.179 0.017 -10.29 *** 
Converted flat -0.177 0.027 -6.5 *** 
Second bedroom 0.135 0.016 8.65 *** 
Third bedroom 0.221 0.018 12.36 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.302 0.021 14.32 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.285 0.028 10.3 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 12724.06 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 1662.7002 ***   
Ward premium 0.1309938 0.0206804   
LR test vs. linear regression: 970.53 ***   
Observations 2574    
Groups (wards) 22    
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Wigan house price model estimation results 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error z statistic 
Constant 10.939 0.054 203.56 *** 
2003 premium 0.205 0.012 17.75 *** 
2004 premium 0.46 0.014 33.94 *** 
2005 premium 0.551 0.015 37.62 *** 
2006 premium 0.605 0.012 49.48 *** 
2007 premium 0.659 0.012 53.55 *** 
Square feet 0.0004858 0.0000201 24.12 *** 
Built before 1971 -0.158 0.013 -12.57 *** 
Built before 1981 -0.092 0.016 -5.85 *** 
Built before 1991 -0.046 0.016 -2.85 *** 
New-build 0.077 0.022 3.55 *** 
No central heating -0.136 0.022 -6.21 *** 
Partial central heating -0.05 0.019 -2.59 ** 
Single garage 0.118 0.009 12.71 *** 
Double garage 0.168 0.022 7.59 *** 
Detached 0.125 0.013 9.43 *** 
Terraced -0.17 0.011 -15.26 *** 
Detached bungalow 0.277 0.032 8.65 *** 
Semi-detached bungalow 0.098 0.022 4.45 *** 
Flat -0.105 0.041 -2.57 ** 
Leasehold 0.032 0.008 3.97 *** 
Second bedroom 0.162 0.045 3.64 *** 
Third bedroom 0.24 0.045 5.29 *** 
Fourth bedroom 0.29 0.049 5.9 *** 
Fifth bedroom 0.238 0.067 3.54 *** 
Wald chi2(22) 11024.18 ***   
Log restricted-likelihood 462.84335 ***   
Ward premium 0.1292995 0.0196166   
LR test vs. linear regression: 673.74 ***   
Observations 2531    




Appendix 5: Predicting Development Viability 
 
Chapter 5 (Table 9) sets out the results of the development viability model estimation. These 
can be used to predict the viability for a given site. This is done by combining the known 
values of variables with model estimates or coefficients. 
 
For example, the following table summarises the important variables for brownfield sites in 




Value for the least 
deprived 
neighbourhood 
Value for the typical 
neighbourhood 




per 1000 households 
7.12 7.12 7.12 
Lower quartile house 
prices to earnings 
6.23 6.23 6.23 
Interest rates 
(average for 2005) 
3.68 3.68 3.68 
Total outstanding planning 
consents per 1000 households 
6.77 6.77 6.77 
Units 
(assume a 15 unit site) 
15 15 15 
Units2 625 625 625 
IMD score 3.75 24.84 63.14 
North Tyneside sum 
of greenfield supply ÷ distance 
0.030095 0.030095 0.030095 
North Tyneside sum 
of brownfield supply ÷ distance 




The corresponding coefficients from Table 9 in the main report are reproduced below: 
 
Variable 
Value for the least deprived 
neighbourhood 
Constant 0.635471 
Private completions per 1000 households -0.00742 
Lower quartile house prices to earnings 0.059706 
Interest rates -0.28886 
Total outstanding planning consents per 1000 households -0.01201 
Units 0.041667 
Units2 -0.00015 
IMD score -0.00412 
North Tyneside sum of greenfield supply ÷ distance -2.93116 
North Tyneside sum of brownfield supply ÷ distance -0.38935 
 
 
In order to predict viability, the variables are simply multiplied by the coefficients and a 
running total is calculated. For example, for a brownfield site in the least deprived 
neighbourhood in North Tyneside in 2005, the calcultion is as follows: 
 
 32 
Natural log of viability = 0.635471 + (-0.00742 × 7.12) + (0.059706 × 6.23) 
+ (-0.28886 × 3.68) + (-0.01201 × 6.77) 
+ (0.041667 × 15) + (-0.00015 × 625) 
+ (-0.00412 × 3.75) + (-2.93116 × 0.030095) 
+ (-0.38935 × 0.142353) 
 
   = 0.2411 
 
When the anti-log (exponential) of this value is calculated, this translates to a predicted 
viability index of 1.2763, ignoring rounding differnces in this example.3 
 
This means that the development has a predicted value 27.63% higher than predicted 
construction costs. This residual logically represent  the amount available for land acquisition 
and developer’s profit. 
 
Following this process, the viability of all three sites shown in the first table in this appendix 
can be estimated as follows: 
 
15 unit brownfield site in the least deprived neighbourhood  1.2763 
15 unit brownfield site in the typical neighbourhood   1.1660 





















                                                
3 There may be small rounding differences between th final figures shown, and the example calculation. 
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